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Prevention and Control of Tuberculosis in Correctional
and Detention Facilities: Recommendations from CDC
Endorsed by the Advisory Council for the Elimination of Tuberculosis,
the National Commission on Correctional Health Care,
and the American Correctional Association
Summary
Tuberculosis (TB) control can be particularly problematic in correctional and detention facilities, in which persons from diverse
backgrounds and communities are housed in close proximity for varying periods. This report provides a framework and general
guidelines for effective prevention and control of TB in jails, prisons, and other correctional and detention facilities. Recommen-
dations were developed on the basis of published guidelines and a review of the scientific literature. Effective TB-prevention and
-control measures in correctional facilities include early identification of persons with TB disease through entry and periodic
follow-up screening; successful treatment of TB disease and latent TB infection; appropriate use of airborne precautions (e.g.,
airborne infection isolation, environmental controls, and respiratory protection); comprehensive discharge planning; and thor-
ough and efficient contact investigation. These measures should be instituted in close collaboration with local or state health
department TB-control programs and other key partners. Continuing education of inmates, detainees, and correctional facility
staff is necessary to maximize cooperation and participation. To ensure TB-prevention and -control measures are effective,
periodic program evaluation should be conducted.
rectional and public health officials, this report defines the
essential activities necessary for preventing transmission of
M. tuberculosis in correctional facilities. These fundamental
activities can be categorized as 1) screening (finding persons
with TB disease and latent TB infection [LTBI]); 2) contain-
ment (preventing transmission of TB and treating patients
with TB disease and LTBI); 3) assessment (monitoring and
evaluating screening and containment efforts); and 4) collabo-
ration between correctional facilities and public health
departments in TB control. These overarching activities are
best achieved when correctional facility and public health
department staff are provided with clear roles of shared
responsibility.
The recommendations in this report can assist officials of
federal, state, and local correctional facilities in preventing trans-
mission of TB and controlling TB among inmates and facility
employees. The target audience for this report includes public
health department personnel, correctional medical directors and
administrators, private correctional health vendors, staff in fed-
eral and state agencies, staff in professional organizations, and
health-care professionals. The report is intended to assist
policymakers in reaching informed decisions regarding the pre-
vention and control of TB in correctional facilities.
Methods
To update the existing guidelines, with assistance from
ACET, CDC organized and convened the Tuberculosis in
Introduction
Tuberculosis (TB) is a disease caused by Mycobacterium
tuberculosis that adversely affects public health around the
world (1). In the United States, TB control remains a sub-
stantial public health challenge in multiple settings. TB can
be particularly problematic in correctional and detention
facilities (2), in which persons from diverse backgrounds and
communities are housed in close proximity for varying peri-
ods. Effective TB prevention and control measures in correc-
tional facilities are needed to reduce TB rates among inmates
and the general U.S. population.
The recommendations provided in this report for the con-
trol of TB in correctional facilities expand on, update, and
supersede recommendations issued by the Advisory Council
for the Elimination of TB (ACET) in 1996 (3). This report
provides a framework and general guidelines for effective pre-
vention and control of TB in jails, prisons, and other correc-
tional and detention facilities. In addition, on the basis of
existing scientific knowledge and applied experience of cor-
The material in this report originated in the National Center for HIV/
AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention (proposed), Kevin
Fenton, MD, PhD, Director, and the Division of Tuberculosis
Elimination, Kenneth G. Castro, MD, Director.
Corresponding address: Division of Tuberculosis Elimination, National
Center for HIV/AIDS, Viral Hepatitis, STD, and TB Prevention
(proposed), CDC, 1600 Clifton Road, NE, MS E-10, Atlanta, GA
30333. Telephone: 404-639-8120; Fax: 404-639-8604.
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Corrections Working Group, an ad hoc group of persons with
expertise in public health and health care in correctional
facilities. Organizations represented in the Working Group
included ACET, the National Commission on Correctional
Health Care, the American Correctional Association, the
American Jail Association, and the Society of Correctional
Physicians. The Working Group reviewed published guide-
lines and recommendations, published and unpublished poli-
cies and protocols, and peer-reviewed studies discussing overall
TB prevention and control and aspects of TB prevention and
control specific to correctional and detention facilities. These
guidelines, recommendations, policies, protocols, and studies
form the basis for the Working Group’s recommendations.
Because controlled trials are lacking for TB prevention and
control activities and interventions specific to correctional and
detention facilities, the recommendations have not been rated
on the quality and quantity of the evidence. The recommen-
dations reflect the expert opinion of the Working Group mem-
bers with regard to best practices, based on their experience
and their review of the literature.
Summary of Changes from Previous
Recommendations
These guidelines are intended for short- and long-term con-
finement facilities (e.g., prisons, jails, and juvenile detention
centers), which are typically referred to as correctional facili-
ties throughout this report. These recommendations differ as
follows from those made in 1996:
• The target audience has been broadened to include
persons working in jails and other detention facilities.
• The need for correctional and detention facilities to base
screening procedures for inmates and detainees on assess-
ment of their risk for TB is emphasized. A description of
how TB risk should be assessed is included.
• The need for institutions to conduct a review of symp-
toms of TB for all inmates and detainees at entry is
discussed.
• The need for all inmates and detainees with suspected TB
to be placed in airborne infection isolation (AII) immedi-
ately is emphasized.
• Testing recommendations have been updated to reflect
the development of the QuantiFERON®-TB Gold test
(QFT-G), a new version of the QuantiFERON®-TB
(QFT) diagnostic test for M. tuberculosis infection.
• The section on environmental controls has been expanded
to cover local exhaust ventilation, general ventilation, air
cleaning, and implementation of an environmental con-
trol program. Ventilation recommendations for selected
areas in new or renovated correctional facilities have been
included.
• A section on respiratory protection has been added,
including information on implementing respiratory pro-
tection programs.
• Treatment recommendations for TB and LTBI have been
updated on the basis of the most recent treatment state-
ments published by CDC, the American Thoracic Soci-
ety (ATS), and the Infectious Diseases Society of America.
• Emphasis is placed on case management of inmates with
TB disease and LTBI.
• The need for early discharge planning coordinated with
local public health staff is emphasized.
• A section has been included on U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement detainees.
• The importance of collaboration between correctional
facility and public health staff is emphasized, particularly with
respect to discharge planning and contact investigation.
• The need for corrections staff to work closely with public
health staff to tailor an appropriately comprehensive train-
ing program to achieve and sustain TB control in a cor-
rectional facility is emphasized.
• The need for public health workers to receive education
regarding the correctional environment is emphasized.
• Program evaluation is emphasized. Recommended areas
of evaluation include assessment of TB risk in the facility,
performance measurement for quality improvement,
collaboration, information infrastructure, and using evalu-
ation information to improve the TB-control program.
Background
During 1980–2003, the number of incarcerated persons in
the United States increased fourfold, from approximately
500,000 in 1980 to approximately 2 million in 2003 (4,5).
A disproportionately high percentage of TB cases occur among
persons incarcerated in U.S. correctional facilities. In 2003 at
midyear, although 0.7% of the total US population was con-
fined in prisons and jails, 3.2% of all TB cases nationwide
occurred among residents of correctional facilities (6).
Although overall incidence of new TB cases among the U.S.
population has remained at <10 cases per 100,000 persons
since 1993 (6), substantially higher case rates have been
reported in correctional populations (2). For example, the
incidence of TB among inmates in New Jersey during 1994
was 91.2 cases per 100,000 inmates, compared with 11.0 cases
per 100,000 persons among all New Jersey residents (3). In
1991, a TB case rate for inmates of a California prison was
184 cases per 100,000 persons, which was 10 times greater
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than the statewide rate (7). In addition, in 1993, the TB rate
for inmates in the New York State correctional system was
139.3 cases per 100,000 persons, an increase from the rate of
15.4 during 1976–1978 (3,8). In California, the TB case rate
reported from an urban jail in a high-prevalence area was 72.1
cases per 100,000 inmates in 1998, representing 10% of the
county’s cases in that year (9). Studies have demonstrated the
prevalence of LTBI among inmates to be as high as 25%
(10–14). Other studies have demonstrated a correlation
between length of incarceration and positive tuberculin skin
test (TST) response, indicating that transmission might
have occurred in these facilities (15,16).
At least three factors contribute to the high rate of TB in
correctional and detention facilities. First, disparate numbers
of incarcerated persons are at high risk for TB (e.g., users of
illicit substances [e.g., injection drugs], persons of low socio-
economic status, and persons with human immunodeficiency
virus [HIV] infection). These persons often have not received
standard public health interventions or nonemergency medi-
cal care before incarceration. Second, the physical structure
of the facilities contributes to disease transmission, as facili-
ties often provide close living quarters, might have inadequate
ventilation, and can be overcrowded (9,17–19). Third, move-
ment of inmates into and out of overcrowded and inadequately
ventilated facilities, coupled with existing TB-related risk fac-
tors of the inmates, combine to make correctional and deten-
tion facilities a high-risk environment for the transmission of
M. tuberculosis and make implementation of TB-control mea-
sures particularly difficult (19). Despite recent efforts to
improve TB-control measures in correctional and detention
facilities, outbreaks of TB continue to occur in these settings,
and TB disease has been transmitted to persons living in nearby
communities (20–22). Consequently, correctional and deten-
tion facilities are critical settings in which to provide inter-
ventions for detecting and treating TB among a vulnerable
population.
Addressing the Challenges of TB Control
in Correctional Facilities
Published recommendations for elimination of TB in the
United States include testing and treating inmates in correc-
tional facilities for LTBI to prevent the development and trans-
mission of TB (23). The basis for this recommendation is that
LTBI and coinfection with HIV are more common in these
underserved populations than in the general population
(24–26). However, treating correctional inmates for LTBI can
be challenging.
Before being incarcerated, inmates might have faced barri-
ers to accessing community health services necessary for the
detection and treatment of TB disease and LTBI (27). In
addition, inmates released from correctional facilities often
do not attend clinic visits or adhere to treatment regimens.
One study of inmates released before completion of TB therapy
indicated that only 43% made at least one visit to the clinic
after release (28). In another jail setting, using an educational
intervention increased the rate of clinic visits after release from
3% to only 23% (29).
In the United States, TB is concentrated increasingly among
the most disadvantaged populations, particularly immigrants
(30). Detained immigrants are arriving largely from countries
with a high prevalence of TB (e.g., Mexico, the Philippines,
and Vietnam) and therefore present unique challenges in the
elimination of TB in the United States* (31). Social and legal
barriers often make standard testing and treatment interven-
tions inadequate among undocumented immigrants (31). In
certain instances, these patients have become resistant to first-
line anti-TB drugs because of the interrupted treatment
received in their countries of origin (32). However, undocu-
mented immigrants placed in detention and correctional
facilities have an opportunity to receive TB screening and be-
gin treatment for TB disease (33).
Rationale for Updating and Strengthening
TB Control and Prevention Guidelines
Transmission of M. tuberculosis continues to be documented
within correctional facilities, primarily as a result of undiag-
nosed TB. Inmates with undiagnosed TB disease place other
inmates and correctional staff at risk for TB, and when released,
these persons also can infect persons living in surrounding
communities (16,17,20,21,22,34,35).
Despite the continued transmission of TB in correctional
settings, few comprehensive evaluations of the implementa-
tion of TB-detection and -control procedures in correctional
facilities have been performed (36–38). Nevertheless, correc-
tional facilities are increasingly basing their TB prevention
and control procedures on studies and data that support judi-
cious interventions, including screening, case finding, case
* The epidemiology of TB in the United States has changed dramatically since
the early 1990s. Immigration from countries with a high prevalence of TB
contributes substantially to the continued high rates of disease and
transmission among foreign-born persons. In 2003, the rate of TB among
foreign-born persons in the Untied States was 8.7 times higher than the rate
for persons born in the United States. More than half of new TB cases in
2003 occurred in foreign-born persons, particularly those from Mexico, the
Philippines, and Vietnam. Of 114 patients in whom multi-drug resistant
TB (MDR TB) were diagnosed, foreign-born persons accounted for 95 (83%)
cases (6). Detention facilities and local jails frequently contract with U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to house detainees, a practice
that should be accounted for in assessing a facility’s risk status.
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management, outbreak and contact investigations, and treat-
ment for LTBI (7,9,14,21,28,33,34,39–46). Improving TB
prevention and control practices within these settings is nec-
essary to reduce rates of disease and eventually eliminate TB.
TB prevention and control practices within correctional
facilities should be strengthened for multiple reasons:
• M. tuberculosis is spread through the air. One highly
infectious person can infect inmates, correctional staff,
and visitors who share the same air space.
• Immediate isolation of infectious patients can interrupt
transmission of M. tuberculosis in the facility.
• Prompt initiation of an adequate regimen of directly
observed therapy (DOT)† helps ensure adherence to treat-
ment because a health-care professional, a specially trained
correctional officer, or a health department employee
observes the patient swallowing each dose of medication.
This method of treatment can diminish infectiousness,
reduce the risk for relapse, and help prevent the develop-
ment of drug-resistant strains of M. tuberculosis.
• Inmates of correctional facilities have been reported to
have relatively high rates of HIV infection; persons who
are coinfected with HIV and M. tuberculosis are at high
risk for progressing from LTBI to TB disease.
• A completed regimen of treatment for LTBI can prevent
the development of TB disease in persons who are
infected with M. tuberculosis.
• Correctional facility officials have an opportunity to treat
inmates who have TB disease or LTBI before such
inmates are released into the community.
• Because a substantial proportion of inmates do not have
any other access to the health-care system, the correctional
setting can be a primary source of health information,
intervention, and maintenance.
Screening
Early identification and successful treatment of persons with
TB disease remains the most effective means of preventing
disease transmission (47). Therefore, inmates who are likely
to have infectious TB should be identified and begin treat-
ment before they are integrated into the general correctional
facility population (i.e., at the time of admission into the cor-
rectional system). When possible, newly arrived inmates should
not be housed with other inmates until they have been appro-
priately screened for TB disease. Screening programs in the
correctional setting also allow for the detection of substantial
numbers of persons with LTBI who are at high risk for pro-
gressing to TB disease and would likely benefit from a course
of treatment. This secondary benefit of screening programs is
often limited by inability to initiate and ensure completion of
LTBI treatment, particularly in short-term correctional facili-
ties. In addition to screening at intake, routine (i.e., at least
annual) screening of long-term inmates and correctional
facility staff (e.g., custody and medical) should be incorpo-
rated into the TB-control program (48,49).
How screening activities should be implemented depends
on multiple factors, including 1) the type of facility, 2) the
prevalence of TB infection and disease in the facility, 3) the
prevalence of TB in the inmates’ communities, 4) the preva-
lence of other risk factors for TB (e.g., HIV) in the inmate
population, and 5) the average length of stay of inmates in
the facility. The type of screening recommended for a particu-
lar facility is determined by an assessment of the risk for TB
transmission within that facility. The risk assessment should
be performed at least annually and should be made in col-
laboration with the local or state health department. A facility’s
TB risk can be defined as being minimal or nonminimal.
A facility has minimal TB risk if
• no cases of infectious TB have occurred in the facility in
the last year,
• the facility does not house substantial numbers of inmates
with risk factors for TB (e.g., HIV infection and injection-
drug use),
• the facility does not house substantial numbers of new
immigrants (i.e., persons arriving in the United States
within the previous 5 years) from areas of the world with
high rates of TB, and
• employees of the facility are not otherwise at risk for TB.
Any facility that does not meet these criteria should be cat-
egorized as a nonminimal TB risk facility.
Screening Methods
Symptom Screening
Whenever possible, health-care professionals should perform
the initial screening. However, correctional officers in jails
(particularly those housing minimal numbers of inmates) fre-
quently administer health intake questionnaires. If custody
staff members conduct the intake screening, they should
receive adequate periodic training in taking a medical history,
making necessary observations, and determining the appro-
priate disposition of inmates with signs or symptoms of pos-
sible medical problems. Staff conducting medical intake should
receive appropriate counseling and education regarding medi-
cal confidentiality.
† Therapy that involves providing the anti-TB drugs directly to the patient
and watching as the patient swallows the medications. DOT is the preferred
core management strategy for all patients with TB. DOT for LTBI is referred
to sometimes as directly observed preventive therapy.
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During their initial medical screening, inmates should be
asked if they have a history of TB disease or if they have been
treated for LTBI or TB disease previously. Documentation of
any such history should be obtained from medical records, if
possible. Inmates should be observed for the presence of a
cough or evidence of significant weight loss. All incoming
inmates in any size jail, prison, or other detention facility (e.g.,
immigration enforcement) should be immediately screened
for symptoms of pulmonary TB by being asked if they have
had a prolonged cough (i.e., one lasting >3 weeks), hemopty-
sis (i.e., bloody sputum), or chest pain. The index of suspi-
cion should be high when pulmonary symptoms are
accompanied by general, systemic symptoms of TB (e.g., fever,
chills, night sweats, easy fatigability, loss of appetite, and weight
loss). Inmates should be interviewed systematically (i.e., using a
standardized questionnaire) to determine whether they have
experienced symptoms in recent weeks. Inmates who have
symptoms suggestive of TB disease should immediately
receive a thorough medical evaluation, including a TST or
QFT-G, a chest radiograph, and, if indicated, sputum exami-
nations.
Persons with symptoms suggestive of TB disease or with a
history of inadequate treatment for TB disease should be
immediately placed in an AII room§ until they have under-
gone a thorough medical evaluation. If deemed infectious,
such persons should remain in isolation until treatment has
rendered them noninfectious. Facilities without an on-site AII
room should have a written plan for referring patients with
suspected or confirmed TB to a facility that is equipped to
isolate, evaluate, and treat TB patients.
Symptom screening alone is an unsatisfactory screening
mechanism for TB, except in facilities with a minimal risk for
TB transmission. The use of symptom screening alone often
will fail to detect pulmonary TB in inmates.
Chest-Radiograph Screening
Screening with chest radiographs can be an effective means
of detecting new cases of unsuspected TB disease at intake to
a correctional facility. In addition, radiographic screening
requires fewer subsequent visits than a TST (i.e., only those
inmates with suspicious radiographs or TB symptoms require
follow-up). However, such screening will not identify inmates
with LTBI. One study demonstrated that screening inmates
with a chest radiograph doubled the TB case-finding rate and
reduced the time from intake into the correctional facility to
isolation substantially compared with TST testing (2.3 days
and 7.5 days, respectively), thereby reducing the risk for TB
exposure for other inmates and staff (50). Digital radiographs
(miniature or full-size) provide enhanced imaging and
improved storage and readability. A miniature radiograph can
be performed in <1 minute and exposes the patient to
approximately one tenth the radiation dose of a conventional
radiograph. One cost-effectiveness analysis of miniature chest
radiography for TB screening on admission to jail indicated
that more cases were detected with this method than either
TST or symptom screening, and the cost of radiograph screen-
ing was less per case detected (51). The extent to which radio-
logic screening is used in a given institution should be dictated
by multiple factors, including 1) local epidemiologic charac-
teristics of TB disease; 2) inmate length of stay; 3) the ability
of the health-care professionals within the facility to conduct
careful histories, tuberculin skin or QFT-G testing, and cross-
matches with state TB registries; and 4) timeliness of the
radiographic study and its reading. Screening with chest
radiographs might be appropriate in certain jails and deten-
tion facilities that house substantial numbers of inmates for
short periods and serve populations at high risk for TB (e.g.,
those with high prevalence of HIV infection or history of
injection-drug use and foreign-born persons from countries
in which TB prevalence is high).
Inmates who are infected with HIV might be anergic and
consequently might have false-negative TST results. However,
routine anergy panel testing is not recommended because it
has not been demonstrated to assist in diagnosing or exclud-
ing LTBI (52). In facilities that do not perform routine radio-
graphic screening for all inmates, a chest radiograph should
be part of the initial screening of HIV-infected patients and
those who are at risk for HIV infection but whose status is
unknown.
In facilities with on-site radiographic screening, the chest
radiograph should be performed as part of intake screening
and read promptly by a physician, preferably within 24 hours.
Persons who have radiographs suggestive of TB should be iso-
lated immediately and evaluated further. Sputum-smear and
culture examinations should be performed for inmates whose
chest radiographs are consistent with TB disease and might
be indicated for at least certain persons who are symptomatic,
regardless of their TST, QFT-G, or chest radiograph results
because persons with HIV and TB disease might have “nega-
tive” chest radiographs in addition to false-negative TST or
QFT-G results.
§ Formerly called a negative pressure isolation room, an AII room is a single-
occupancy patient-care room used to isolate persons with suspected or
confirmed infectious TB disease. Environmental factors are controlled in
AII rooms to minimize the transmission of infectious agents that are usually
spread from person to person by droplet nuclei associated with coughing or
aerosolization of contaminated fluids. AII rooms should provide negative
pressure in the room so clean air flows under the door gap into the room, an
air flow rate of 6–12 air changes per hour (ACH), and direct exhaust of air
from the room to the outside of the building or recirculation of air through
a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter.
6 MMWR July 7, 2006
Mantoux TST Screening
Tuberculin skin testing using 0.1 mL of 5 tuberculin units
(TU) of purified protein derivative (PPD) is the most com-
mon method of testing for TB infection. Multiple-puncture
tests (e.g., the tine test) should not be used to determine
whether a person is infected. Persons who have a documented
history of a positive TST result (with a millimeter [mm] read-
ing), a documented history of TB disease, or a reported his-
tory of a severe necrotic reaction to tuberculin should be
exempt from a routine TST. For persons with a history of
severe necrotic reactions and without a documented positive
result with a millimeter reading, a QFT-G may be substituted
for the TST. Otherwise, such persons should be screened for
symptoms of TB and receive a chest radiograph unless they
have had one recently (i.e., within 6 months) and are not symp-
tomatic. Pregnancy, lactation, or previous vaccination with
Bacillus Calmette-Guerin (BCG) vaccine are not contra-
indications for tuberculin skin testing. The TST is not com-
pletely sensitive for TB disease; its sensitivity ranges from
75%–90% (53,54). Despite this limitation, skin testing, along
with use of a symptom review, frequently constitutes the most
practical approach to screening for TB disease.
A trained health-care professional should place the TST and
interpret the reaction 48–72 hours after the injection by mea-
suring the area of induration (i.e., the palpable swelling) at
the injection site. The diameter of the indurated area should
be measured across the width of the forearm. Erythema (i.e.,
the redness of the skin) should not be measured. All reactions,
even those classified as negative, should be recorded in milli-
meters of induration.
In the majority of cases, a TST reaction of >10 mm indura-
tion is considered a positive result in inmates and correctional
facility employees. However, an induration of >5 mm is con-
sidered a positive result in the following persons:
• persons infected with HIV,
• persons who are recent contacts of patients with TB
disease,
• persons with fibrotic changes on chest radiograph
consistent with previous TB disease,
• organ transplant recipients and patients with other
immunocompromising conditions (e.g., persons receiv-
ing >15 mg/day of prednisone for >1 month), and
• persons suspected of having TB disease.
Persons who have a positive TST result and no symptoms
suggestive of TB disease should be evaluated with a chest
radiograph within 72 hours after the skin test is interpreted.
Persons who have symptoms suggestive of TB disease should
be evaluated immediately and placed in an AII room until TB
is ruled out (see Symptom Screening).
The use of two-step testing can reduce the number of posi-
tive TSTs that would otherwise be misclassified as recent skin-
test conversions during future periodic screenings. Certain
persons who were infected with M. tuberculosis years earlier
exhibit waning delayed-type hypersensitivity to tuberculin.
When they are skin tested years after infection, they might
have a false-negative TST result (even though they are truly
infected). However, this first skin test years after the infection
might stimulate the ability to react to subsequent tests, result-
ing in a “booster” reaction. When the test is repeated, the
reaction might be misinterpreted as a new infection (recent
conversion) rather than a boosted reaction. For two-step test-
ing, persons whose baseline TSTs yield a negative result are
retested 1–3 weeks after the initial test. If the second test
result is negative, they are considered not infected. If the sec-
ond test result is positive, they are classified as having had
previous TB infection. Two-step testing should be considered
for the baseline testing of persons who report no history of a
recent TST and who will receive repeated TSTs as part of an
institutional periodic skin-testing program. In the majority of
cases, a two-step TST is not practical in jails because of the
short average length of stay of inmates.
In the past, a panel of other common antigens was often
applied with the TST to obtain information regarding the
competence of the patient’s cellular immune system and to
identify anergy. More recently, however, anergy testing has
been demonstrated to be of limited usefulness because of prob-
lems with standardization and reproducibility, the low risk
for TB associated with a diagnosis of anergy, and the lack of
apparent benefit of preventive therapy for groups of anergic
HIV-infected persons. Therefore, the use of anergy testing in
conjunction with a TST is no longer recommended routinely
for screening programs for M. tuberculosis infection in the
United States (52).
Intracutaneous inoculation with BCG is currently used
worldwide as a vaccine against TB. BCG is a live attenuated
Mycobacterium bovis strain that stimulates the immune system
to protect against TB. No reliable method has been developed
to distinguish TST reactions caused by vaccination with BCG
from those caused by natural mycobacterial infections, although
reactions of >20 mm of induration are not likely caused by
BCG (55). TST is not contraindicated for persons who have
been vaccinated with BCG, and the TST results of such per-
sons are used to support or exclude the diagnosis of M. tubercu-
losis infection. A diagnosis of M. tuberculosis infection and
treatment for LTBI should be considered for any BCG-
vaccinated person who has a positive TST reaction. The same
criteria for interpretation of TST results are used for both BCG-
vaccinated and nonvaccinated persons (56).
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QuantiFERON®-TB Gold Test
In May 2005, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) licensed QFT-G. This in-vitro diagnostic test measures
the amount of interferon-gamma produced by cells in whole
blood that have been stimulated by mycobacterial peptides.
The peptides used in the test mimic proteins known as
ESAT-6 and CFP-10, which are present in M. tuberculosis but
absent from all BCG strains and from the majority of com-
monly encountered non-TB mycobacteria. The test is intended
for use as a diagnostic tool for M. tuberculosis infection,
including both TB disease and LTBI. As with a TST, QFT-G
cannot distinguish between LTBI and TB disease and should
be used in conjunction with risk assessment, radiography, and
other diagnostic evaluations. The advantages of QFT-G com-
pared with TST are that 1) results can be obtained after a
single patient visit, 2) the variability associated with skin-test
reading can be reduced because “reading” is performed in a
qualified laboratory, and 3) QFT-G is not affected by previ-
ous BCG vaccination and eliminates the unnecessary treat-
ment of persons with false-positive results. QFT-G does not
affect the result of future QFT-G tests (i.e., no “boosting”
occurs). Limitations of the test include the need for phle-
botomy, the need to process blood specimens within 12 hours
of collection for the most recent version of the test, the lim-
ited number of laboratories that process the test, and a lack of
clinical experience in interpreting test results. The elimina-
tion of the second visit for reading the TST, however, is likely
to render the QFT-G competitive in cost-benefit consider-
ations.
Although the performance of QFT-G has not been evalu-
ated sufficiently in select populations of interest (e.g., HIV-
infected persons), available data indicate that QFT-G is as
sensitive as TST for detection of TB disease and more specific
than TST for detection of LTBI (57,58). CDC guidelines for
QFT-G recommend that QFT-G can be used in place of TST
in all circumstances in which TST is currently used (58). This
includes initial and periodic TB screening for correctional
facility inmates and employees and testing of exposed persons
in contact investigations. Because data are insufficient regard-
ing performance of QFT-G in certain clinical situations, as
with a negative TST result, a negative QFT-G result alone
might not be sufficient to exclude M. tuberculosis infection in
these situations. Examples of such clinical scenarios include
those involving patients with severe immunosuppression who
have had recent exposure to a patient with TB and patients
being treated or about to undergo treatment with potent
tumor necrosis factor alpha (TNF-α) antagonists.
Use of Local Health Department
TB Registry
Correctional facilities and local health departments should
collaborate to ensure effective TB screening in the correctional
setting. Inmates might provide inaccurate information on
admission for multiple reasons, ranging from forgetfulness and
confusion to deliberate misrepresentation. Health departments
should perform cross-matches with the local TB registry and
search for matches on known aliases, birth dates, maiden
names, and other personal information for inmates suspected
of having TB infection. A readily accessible record of previous
TB history, drug-susceptibility patterns, treatment, and com-
pliance can be useful in determining the disposition of a given
patient with suspected TB.
Initial Screening
The following procedures should be used for the initial
screening of inmates and detainees (depending on their length
of stay in the facility and the type of facility) and for all cor-
rectional facility employees, regardless of the type of facility.
Inmates in Minimal TB Risk Facilities
Inmates in all minimal TB risk correctional and detention
facilities should be evaluated on entry for symptoms of TB.
Persons with symptoms of TB should be evaluated immedi-
ately to rule out the presence of infectious disease and kept in
an AII room until they are evaluated. If the facility does not
have an AII room, the inmate should be transported to a
facility that has one. In addition, all newly arrived inmates
should be evaluated for clinical conditions and other factors
that increase the risk for infection or the risk for progressing
to TB disease, including the following:
• HIV infection,
• recent immigration,
• history of TB,
• recent close contact with a person with TB disease,
• injection-drug use,
• diabetes mellitus,
• immunosuppressive therapy,
• hematologic malignancy or lymphoma,
• chronic renal failure,
• medical conditions associated with substantial weight loss
or malnutrition, or
• history of gastrectomy or jejunoileal bypass.
Persons with any of these conditions require further screen-
ing with a TST, a QFT-G, or a chest radiograph within 7 days
of arrival. Regardless of the TST or QFT-G result, inmates
known to have HIV infection or other severe immunosup-
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pression, and those who are at risk for HIV infection but whose
HIV status is unknown, should have a chest radiograph taken
as part of the initial screening. Persons who have an abnormal
chest radiograph should be further evaluated to rule out TB
disease; if TB disease is excluded as a diagnosis, LTBI therapy
should be considered if the TST or QFT-G result is positive.
Inmates in Nonminimal TB Risk Prisons
Immediately on arrival, all new inmates should be screened
for symptoms, and any inmate with symptoms suggestive of
TB should be placed in an AII room and evaluated promptly
for TB disease. If the facility does not have an AII room, the
inmate should be transported to a facility that has one.
Inmates who have no symptoms require further screening with
a TST, a QFT-G, or a chest radiograph within 7 days of arrival.
Regardless of their TST or QFT-G status, inmates known to
have HIV infection or other severe immunosuppression, and
those who are at risk for HIV infection but whose HIV status
is unknown, should have a chest radiograph taken as part of
the initial screening. Persons who have an abnormal chest
radiograph should be further evaluated to rule out TB dis-
ease; if TB disease is excluded as a diagnosis, LTBI therapy
should be considered if the TST or QFT-G result is positive.
As the rate of TB disease in the United States has decreased,
identification and treatment of persons with LTBI who are at
high risk for TB disease have become essential components of
the TB elimination strategy promoted by ACET (59). Tar-
geted testing using the TST or QFT-G identifies persons at
high risk for TB disease who would benefit from treatment
for LTBI. Prisons offer an excellent public health opportunity
for identifying persons at high risk for TB who can be screened
for TB infection and placed on LTBI therapy, if indicated. If
the TST is used, a two-step testing procedure should be
strongly considered when obtaining a baseline reading. A single
step QFT-G is an adequate baseline. Inmates with a positive
test should be evaluated for LTBI therapy after TB disease is
excluded.
Inmates in Nonminimal TB Risk Jails and Other
Short-Term Detention Facilities
As in prisons, all new detainees in nonminimal TB risk jails
should be screened on entry for symptoms, and any detainee
who has symptoms suggestive of TB should be placed imme-
diately in an AII room and evaluated promptly for TB dis-
ease. If the facility does not have an AII room, the inmate
should be transported promptly to a facility that does have
one. Detainees without symptoms require further screening
with a TST, a QFT-G, or a chest radiograph within 7 days of
arrival. Regardless of the TST or QFT-G result, detainees
known to have HIV infection, and those who are at risk for
HIV infection but whose HIV status is unknown, should have
a chest radiograph taken as part of the initial screening. Per-
sons who have a positive result should be further evaluated to
rule out TB disease.
The primary purpose of screening in correctional settings is
to detect TB disease. TST or QFT-G screening in jails to ini-
tiate LTBI therapy often is not practical because of the high
rate of turnover and short lengths of stay. Although not all jail
detainees have short lengths of stay, determining which
detainees will be in the jail for a long term is difficult. Nation-
wide, approximately half of persons detained in local jails are
released within 48 hours of admission. Thus, even if all
detainees can be tested at intake, a large proportion will be
unavailable to have their TSTs read or to be evaluated when
QFT-G test results are available. Of those still in custody, a
substantial percentage will be released before the radiographic
and medical evaluation is completed. In a 1996 study, 43% of
detainees at a county jail in Illinois who had a positive TST
result were released or transferred before their evaluation could
be completed (3).
A substantial proportion of detainees who are incarcerated
long enough to begin LTBI therapy will be released before
completion of treatment. A San Francisco study indicated that
approximately 62% of detainees who were started on LTBI
treatment were released before completion (40). These data
illustrate the challenges of implementing a testing and treat-
ment program for LTBI in jails with highly dynamic detainee
populations. Certain jails have adopted a targeted approach
of performing TSTs only on new detainees who are at high
risk for TB disease (e.g., detainees with known HIV infec-
tion). Screening for TB and treating LTBI are most effective
within the jail setting if resources dedicated to discharge plan-
ning and reliable access to community-based treatment are
available. Modest interventions (e.g., education and incen-
tives [see Glossary]) in the jail setting can lead to improve-
ments in linking released detainees to postrelease medical care
and increase the likelihood that therapy will be completed
(60,61).
Persons in Holding or Booking Facilities
City, county, and other law enforcement authorities frequently
have facilities that hold arrestees and detainees for short periods
of time, ranging from hours to multiple days. TB symptom
screening is recommended for all persons at the time of entry
into these facilities. Any detainee who has symptoms suggestive
of TB should be immediately isolated and transferred to a facil-
ity or hospital in which the detainee can be placed in an AII
room and evaluated promptly for TB disease.
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Employees in All Correctional and Detention
Facilities
A medical history relating to TB should be obtained from
and recorded for all new employees at the time of hiring, and
a physical examination for TB disease should be required. The
results of the screening and examination should be kept con-
fidential; access should be granted to public health and infec-
tion control medical professionals only when necessary. In
addition, a TST or QFT-G should be mandatory for all
employees who do not have a documented history of a posi-
tive result. To improve the accuracy of the baseline result, a
two-step TST or a single-step QFT-G should be used for the
initial screening of employees who have not been tested dur-
ing the preceding 12 months. Persons who have a positive
TST or QFT-G result should have a chest radiograph taken
and interpreted and should be required to have a thorough
medical evaluation; if TB disease is excluded as a diagnosis,
such persons should be considered for LTBI therapy. All
employees should be informed that they should seek appro-
priate follow-up and testing for TB if they are immunosup-
pressed for any reason (e.g., have HIV infection). Any
employee who has symptoms suggestive of TB should not
return to the workplace until a clinician has excluded a diag-
nosis of infectious TB disease.
Other Persons Who Might Need to be Screened
Certain persons who are neither inmates nor employees but
who visit high-risk facilities on a regular basis also should be
considered for screening. These persons might include con-
tractors (e.g., food handlers and service workers), volunteers,
and those providing religious ministries. Screening of these
persons should follow the same procedures as those outlined
for employees.
Periodic Screening
Long-term inmates and all employees who have a negative
TST or QFT-G result should have follow-up testing at least
annually. Persons who have a history of a positive test result
should be screened for symptoms of TB disease. Annual chest
radiographs are unnecessary for the follow-up evaluation of
infected persons. Test results should be recorded in medical
records and in a retrievable aggregate database of all TST or
QFT-G results. Personal identifying information should be
kept confidential.
Correctional facilities can use multiple strategies to ensure
annual screening of long-term inmates for newly acquired TB
infection. Certain institutions schedule annual screening on
the inmate’s date of birth or on the anniversary of the inmate’s
most recent test. Other institutions and systems suspend
inmate movement and screen the entire population on the
same day every year. Methods of screening a subset of the
inmate population (e.g., on a monthly basis) are beneficial
because they provide an ongoing assessment of M.
tuberculosis transmission within the facility.
Results from TST or QFT-G testing should be analyzed
periodically to estimate the risk for acquiring new infection in
a correctional facility; however, this analysis should be com-
pleted by using only the test results of facility employees and
inmates who have remained in the facility continually during
the interval between testing. The conversion rate equals the
number of employees or inmates whose test results have con-
verted from negative to positive (i.e., the numerator) during a
specific interval divided by the total number of previously
negative employees or inmates who were tested during the
same interval (i.e., the denominator). In certain facilities, con-
ducting an analysis of test results for specific areas or groups
within the facility might be appropriate.
More frequent screening is needed when a conversion rate
is substantially higher than previous rates or when other evi-
dence of ongoing transmission is detected. A cluster (i.e.,
either two or more patients with TB disease that are linked by
epidemiologic or genotyping data or two or more TST or
QFT-G conversions occurring in the correctional facility
among inmates who are epidemiologically linked) or other
evidence of person-to-person transmission also warrants
additional epidemiologic investigation and possibly a revision
of the facility’s TB prevention and control protocol.
Facilities in which the risk for infection with M. tuberculosis
is minimal might not need to maintain a periodic screening
program. However, requiring baseline TST or QFT-G testing
of employees would enable medical staff to distinguish
between a TST or QFT-G conversion and a positive TST or
QFT-G result caused by a previous exposure to M. tuberculosis.
A decision to discontinue periodic employee screening should
be made in consultation with the local or state health depart-
ment.
HIV Counseling, Testing, and Referral
HIV counseling, testing, and referral (CTR) should be rou-
tinely recommended for all persons in settings in which the
population is at increased behavioral or clinical risk for
acquiring or transmitting HIV infection, regardless of setting
prevalence (62). Because correctional facilities are considered
settings in which the population is at increased risk for
acquiring or transmitting HIV, routine HIV CTR is recom-
mended for inmates. Furthermore, HIV infection is the great-
est risk factor for progression from LTBI to TB disease (63,64).
Therefore, HIV CTR should be routinely offered to all
10 MMWR July 7, 2006
inmates and correctional facility staff with LTBI or TB dis-
ease if their HIV infection status is unknown at the time of
their LTBI or TB disease diagnosis (64,65). Correctional
facilities should be particularly aware of the need for prevent-
ing transmission of M. tuberculosis in settings in which per-
sons infected with HIV might be housed or might work (66).
Use of Data to Refine Policies
and Procedures
Correctional and detention facilities are strongly encour-
aged to collect and analyze data on the effectiveness of their
TB screening policies and procedures. Working in conjunc-
tion with their state or local TB-control program, correctional
and detention facilities should refine their screening policies
and procedures as indicated by such data. In the absence of
local data that justify revision, correctional and detention
facilities should adhere to the screening recommendations
detailed above.
Case Reporting
All states require designated health-care professionals to
report suspected and confirmed cases of TB to their local or
state health department; this reporting is mandatory for all
correctional facilities, whether private, federal, state, or local.
Correctional facility medical staff should report any suspected
or confirmed TB cases among inmates or employees to the
appropriate health agency in accordance with state and local
laws and regulations, even if the inmate or detainee has
already been released or transferred from the facility. Report-
ing cases to health departments benefits the correctional facil-
ity by allowing it to obtain health department resources for
case management and contact investigation in both the facil-
ity and the community. For each suspected case of TB, the
diagnosis or the exclusion of a diagnosis of TB should be
entered immediately into 1) the person’s medical record,
2) the retrievable aggregate TB-control database at the facil-
ity, and 3) the database at a centralized office if the system has
multiple facilities. In addition, drug-susceptibility results
should be sent to the state or local health department for use
in monitoring the rates of drug resistance in the health
department’s jurisdiction. Drug-susceptibility reports also
should be sent to all health departments managing the infec-
tious person’s contacts because the choice of medication for
LTBI treatment is based on these drug-susceptibility test
results (64). Reports to local or state health departments should
identify the agency that has custodial responsibility for the
inmate (e.g., county corrections agency, state corrections
agency, ICE, Federal Bureau of Prisons [FBOP], and U.S.
Marshals Service [USMS]) and the corresponding identifica-
tion number for that agency (e.g., U.S. alien number, FBOP
number, or USMS number). Federal law enforcement agen-
cies frequently contract for bed space with local or private
detention facilities. Therefore, custodial authority and corre-
sponding custody identification numbers should be verified
with the facility’s custody staff; detention facility medical staff
might not have this information available.
Isolation in an Airborne Infection
Isolation Room
Initiation
TB airborne precautions should be initiated for any patient
who has signs or symptoms of TB disease or who has docu-
mented TB disease and has not completed treatment or not
been determined previously to be noninfectious.
Discontinuation
For patients placed in an AII room because of suspected
infectious TB disease of the lungs, airways, or larynx, airborne
precautions can be discontinued when infectious TB disease
is considered unlikely and either 1) another diagnosis is made
that explains the clinical syndrome or 2) the patient has three
negative acid-fast bacilli (AFB) sputum-smear results (67,68).
The three sputum specimens should be collected 8–24 hours
apart (69), and at least one should be an early morning speci-
men (because respiratory secretions pool overnight). Typically,
this will allow patients with negative sputum-smear results to be
released from an AII room in 2 days. Incarcerated patients for
whom the suspicion of TB disease remains after the collection of
three negative AFB sputum-smear results should not be released
from airborne precautions until they are on standard multidrug
anti-TB treatment and are clinically improving. Because patients
with TB disease who have negative AFB sputum-smear results
can still be infectious (70), patients with suspected disease who
meet the above criteria for release from airborne precautions should
not be released to an area in which other patients with immuno-
compromising conditions are housed.
A patient who has drug-susceptible TB of the lung, airways,
or larynx, is on standard multidrug anti-TB treatment, and
has had a significant clinical and bacteriologic response to
therapy (i.e., reduction in cough, resolution of fever, and pro-
gressively decreasing quantity of AFB on smear result) is prob-
ably no longer infectious. However, because culture and
drug-susceptibility results are not typically known when the
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decision to discontinue airborne precautions is made, all
patients with confirmed TB disease should remain in an AII
room while incarcerated until they
• have had three consecutive negative AFB sputum-smear
results collected 8–24 hours apart, with at least one being
an early morning specimen,
• have received standard multidrug anti-TB treatment, and
• have demonstrated clinical improvement.
Because the consequences of transmission of MDR TB (i.e.,
TB that is resistant to isoniazid and rifampin) are severe,
infection-control practitioners might choose to keep persons
with suspected or confirmed MDR TB disease in an AII room
until negative sputum-culture results have been documented
in addition to negative AFB sputum-smear results.
Environmental Controls
Overview
Guidelines for preventing transmission of M. tuberculosis in
health-care settings and for environmental infection control
in health-care facilities have been published previously (71,72).
These guidelines and this report can be used to educate cor-
rectional facility staff regarding use of environmental controls
in TB infection-control programs.
Environmental controls should be implemented when the
risk for TB transmission persists despite efforts to screen and
treat infected inmates. Environmental controls are used to
remove or inactivate M. tuberculosis in areas in which the
organism could be transmitted. Primary environmental con-
trols consist of controlling the source of infection by using
local exhaust ventilation (e.g., hoods, tents, or booths) and
diluting and removing contaminated air by using general ven-
tilation. These controls help prevent the spread and reduce
the concentration of airborne infectious droplet nuclei (see
Glossary). Environmental controls work in conjunction with
administrative controls such as isolation of inmates with sus-
pected TB disease detected through screening (see Glossary).
Secondary environmental controls consist of controlling the
airflow to prevent contamination of air in areas adjacent to
the source (AII rooms) and cleaning the air (using a HEPA
filter or ultraviolet germicidal irradiation [UVGI]) to increase
the number of equivalent ACH.¶ The efficiency of different
primary or secondary environmental controls varies; details
concerning the application of these controls to prevent trans-
mission of M. tuberculosis in health-care settings have been
published previously (71). To be effective, secondary environ-
mental controls should be used and maintained properly, and
their strengths and limitations should be recognized. The
engineering design and operational efficacy parameters for
UVGI as a secondary control measure (i.e., portable UVGI
units, upper-room air UVGI, and in-duct UVGI) continue
to evolve and require special attention in their design, selec-
tion, and maintenance.
Exposure to M. tuberculosis within correctional facilities can
be reduced through the effective use of environmental con-
trols at the source of exposure (e.g., an infectious inmate) or
in general areas. Source-control techniques can prevent or
reduce the spread of infectious droplet nuclei into the air in
situations in which the source has been identified and the
generation of the contaminant is localized by collecting infec-
tious particles as they are released. Use of these techniques is
particularly prudent during procedures that are likely to gen-
erate infectious aerosols (e.g., bronchoscopy and sputum
induction) and when inmates with infectious TB disease are
coughing or sneezing.
Unsuspected and undiagnosed cases of infectious TB dis-
ease contribute substantially to disease transmission within
correctional facilities (73). When attempting to control this
type of transmission, source control is not a feasible option.
Instead, general ventilation and air cleaning should be relied
on for environmental control. General ventilation can be used
to dilute the air and remove air contaminants and to control
airflow patterns in AII rooms or other correctional facility
settings. Air-cleaning technologies include mechanical air fil-
tration to reduce the concentration of M. tuberculosis droplet
nuclei and UVGI to kill or inactivate microorganisms so they
no longer pose a risk for infection.
Ventilation systems for correctional facility settings should
be designed, and modified when necessary, by ventilation
engineers in collaboration with infection-control practitioners
and occupational health staff. Recommendations for design-
ing and operating ventilation systems in correctional facilities
have been published (48,49,74–76). The multiple types of
and conditions for use of ventilation systems in correctional-
facility settings and the individual needs of these settings pre-
clude provision of extensive guidance in this report.
Incremental improvements in environmental controls (e.g.,
increasing the removal efficiency of an existing filtration sys-
tem in any area) are likely to lessen the potential for TB trans-
mission from persons with unsuspected or undiagnosed TB.
This information should not be used in place of consultation
¶ ACH is the ratio of the volume of air entering the room or booth per hour
to the volume of that room or booth. It equals the exhaust airflow (Q) in
cubic feet per minute (cfm) divided by the volume of the room or booth (V)
in cubic feet (ft3) multiplied by 60 minutes per hour, as expressed thus:
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with experts who can advise on ventilation system and air
handling design, selection, installation, and maintenance.
Because environmental controls will fail if they are not prop-
erly operated and maintained, routine training and education
of infection-control and maintenance staff are key compo-
nents to a successful TB infection-control program.
Airborne Infection Isolation Rooms
Inmates known or suspected of having TB disease should
be placed in an AII room or AII cell that meets the design and
operational criteria for airborne infection isolation described
previously (71). Inmates deemed infectious should remain in
isolation until treatment or further evaluation has ensured that
they are noninfectious. Facilities without an on-site AII room
should have a written plan for referring patients with suspected
or confirmed TB to a facility that is equipped to isolate, evalu-
ate, and treat TB patients.
New or renovated facilities should ensure that a sufficient
number of AII rooms are available consistent with the facility
risk assessment. Under rare circumstances, if an AII room is
not available and the immediate transfer of the inmate with
suspected infectious TB is not possible, the inmate should be
housed temporarily in a room that has been modified to pre-
vent the escape of infectious aerosols outside the TB holding
area. The heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning (HVAC)
system in this temporary TB holding area might have to be
manipulated or augmented with auxiliary exhaust fans to cre-
ate an inward flow of air that reduces the potential escape of
infectious aerosols. If possible, air from these areas should be
exhausted directly to the outdoors. If this is not feasible, the
highest filtration efficiency compatible with the installed
HVAC system should be used. Because TB droplet nuclei are
approximately 1–5 micrometers in size, filtration efficiency
should be evaluated for particles in that size range. Filter se-
lection based on the American Society of Heating, Refrigerat-
ing and Air-Conditioning Engineers (ASHRAE) Standard 52.2
Minimum Efficiency Reporting Value (MERV)–rating effi-
ciency tables can help in this evaluation (77). Secondary air
cleaning techniques (portable air cleaners and UVGI) also can
be used in these areas to increase effective air cleaning.
Local Exhaust Ventilation
Aerosol-producing procedures should be performed in an
area with a type of local exhaust ventilation that captures and
removes airborne contaminants at or near their source with-
out exposing persons in the area to infectious agents. Local
exhaust devices typically use hoods. Two types of hoods are
used: enclosing devices, in which the hood either partially or
fully encloses the infectious source, and exterior devices, in
which the infectious source is near but outside the hood. Fully
enclosed hoods, booths, or tents are always preferable to exte-
rior devices because of their superior ability to prevent con-
taminants from escaping.
Enclosing devices should have sufficient airflow to remove
>99% of airborne particles during the interval between the
departure of one patient and the arrival of the next. The time
required to remove a given percentage of airborne particles
from an enclosed space depends on 1) the ACH number, 2) the
location of the ventilation inlet and outlet, and 3) the physi-
cal configuration of the room or booth. The time interval
required to ensure the proper level of airborne contaminant
removal from enclosing devices varies according to ACH
(Table 1). For example, if an enclosing device operates at six
ACH, and the air inlet and exhaust locations allow for good
air mixing, approximately 46 minutes would be required to
remove 99% of the contaminated air after the aerosol-
producing procedure has ended. Similarly, an additional
23 minutes (total time: 69 minutes) would be required to
increase the removal efficiency to 99.9%. Doubling the venti-
lation rate decreases the waiting time by half.
General Ventilation
General ventilation is used to 1) dilute and remove con-
taminated air, 2) control the direction of airflow in a correc-
tional facility setting, and 3) control airflow patterns in rooms.
Recommended ventilation rates for correctional facility set-
tings are typically expressed in ACH. Ventilation recommen-
TABLE 1. Air changes per hour (ACH) and time required for
removal of airborne contaminants, by efficiency percentage*
Minutes required for removal†
ACH 99.0% efficiency 99.9% efficiency
2 138 207
4 69 104
6 46 69
12 23 35
15 18 28
20 7 14
50 3 6
SOURCE: Modified from the formula for the rate of purging airborne
contaminants (Mutchler JE. Principles of ventilation: the industrial
environment—its evaluation and control. Washington, DC: US Department
of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, CDC, NIOSH;
1973:573–82).
* Values apply to a room or enclosure in which 1) the generation of
aerosols has ceased (e.g., the infectious inmate is no longer present in
the room) or 2) the aerosol procedure has been completed, and the
room or booth is no longer occupied. The times provided assume perfect
mixing of the air in the space; removal times will be longer in rooms or
areas with imperfect mixing or air stagnation. Caution should be
exercised in applying the table to such situations, and expertise from a
qualified engineer or industrial hygienist should be obtained.
†Minutes required for removal of airborne contaminants from the time
that generation of infectious droplet nuclei has ceased.
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dations for selected areas in new or renovated correctional
facility settings should be followed (Table 2). The feasibility
of achieving a specific ventilation rate depends on the con-
struction and operational requirements of the ventilation sys-
tem and might differ for retrofitted and newly constructed
facilities. The expense and effort of achieving a high ventila-
tion rate might be reasonable for new construction but not be
as feasible when retrofitting an existing setting.
Ventilation design guidance for correctional facilities and
related areas has been published (78). This design guidance
includes specific ventilation recommendations regarding
total ventilation, filtration efficiency, and environmental
design parameters. For minimum outdoor air supply recom-
mendations, the guidance refers to ASHRAE Standard 62,
Ventilation for Acceptable Indoor Air Quality. In 2004,
ASHRAE revised and renumbered this standard to ANSI/
ASHRAE Standard 62.1 (74). For areas within correctional
facilities that are not intended to contain persons with infec-
tious TB, the recommended minimum outdoor air supply
rates should meet or exceed those recommended in ANSI/
ASHRAE Standard 62.1-2004 (74). When risk analysis
reveals an enhanced potential for undiagnosed cases of infec-
tious TB, facility designers and owners may consider using
higher supply rates of outdoor air (e.g., those recommended
for areas within health-care facilities anticipated to contain
infectious patients). Minimum outdoor air supply recommen-
dations for health-care facilities have been published (71,79).
Because correctional areas frequently will not have an exact
equivalent area within the health-care environment, the
designer or owner should identify an analogous health-care
area from which to choose the outdoor air supply recommen-
dation. This selection should be made on the basis of occu-
pant risk factors for TB, occupant activities, and occupant
density within the area. For example, the intake, holding, and
processing area of a higher risk correctional facility might be
considered analogous to the emergency waiting room area in
a health-care facility. In that case, the recommended outdoor
air supply would be at least two ACH.
The direction of air movement relative to adjacent areas is
necessary for the containment of contaminated air. Air within a
correctional facility should flow to minimize exposure of others
within the building (Table 2). For example, air inside an AII
room or cell should flow from the corridor and air-supply grille
across the worker, then across that patient, and finally out of
the room. To ensure that air is flowing from the corridor into
an AII room or cell, smoke testing should be performed daily,
even if the AII room or cell is equipped with a pressure-sensing
device. Air flow (supply air and exhaust air) should be mea-
sured at least annually and compared with the designed air flow
TABLE 2. Ventilation recommendations for selected areas in new or renovated correctional facility settings
Minimum Air movement relative All air exhausted
Correctional Area total ACH* to adjacent areas directly outdoors†
Cell or dormitory housing unit 6 In No†
Airborne infection isolation (AII) cells 12 In Yes
Anteroom to AII cell (if present) 10 Out/In§ Yes
Day rooms 6 Out¶ No†
Intake, holding, or processing area 12 In Yes
Kitchen or food preparation area 6–10 In Yes**
Laundry 10–12 In Yes**
Jail ancillary (e.g., dining or visitation) 6 Out¶ No
Courtrooms 6 Out¶ No
SOURCE: Modified from American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc. 2003 ASHRAE Handbook: HVAC applications,
chapter 7, health-care facilities and chapter 8, justice facilities. Atlanta, GA: American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers; 2003.
* Air changes per hour. Outdoor air recommendations for AII rooms and other medical care or treatment areas should follow those published by CDC
(CDC. Guidelines for preventing the transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in health-care settings, 2005. MMWR 2005;54[RR-17]:1–140). For
general population areas, outdoor air supply rates should meet or exceed those prescribed by ASHRAE (American National Standards Institute,
American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers. ANSI/ASHRAE Standard 62.1-2004. Ventilation for acceptable indoor air
quality. Atlanta, GA: American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers; 2004). For general population areas with a potential
elevated tuberculosis risk, minimum outdoor air recommendations that exceed those in Standard 62.1 and are based on analogous areas in health-care
facilities (e.g., using health-care criteria for emergency waiting rooms for correctional intake, holding, or processing areas) can also be applied.
† Single-pass ventilation that safely exhausts all air to the outdoors is the most protective ventilation design approach and should be incorporated within
areas likely to contain infectious aerosols. For general population areas in which persons with unsuspected or undiagnosed infectious tuberculosis (TB)
disease might be present, single-pass ventilation should be considered where and when environmental conditions are compatible. When direct exhaust
to the outdoors is not feasible, the highest filtration efficiency that is compatible with the installed heating, ventilating, and air-conditioning system should
be used. Supplemental methods (e.g., ultraviolet germicidal irradiation or portable air cleaners) may be combined with mechanical filtration in areas that
do not have single-pass ventilation to increase effective air cleaning.
§ Anteroom pressurization should be designed to minimize cross-contamination between patient areas and surrounding areas and should comply with
local fire smoke management regulations.
¶ This determination should be made on the basis of the risk assessment conducted at each facility, with consideration given to the compatibility with a
single-pass ventilation design.
** Exhausting all air from kitchens and laundry rooms to the outdoors is recommended for contaminant (not TB) and odor control.
14 MMWR July 7, 2006
rates to ensure that optimal directional air flow and air exchange
rates are being maintained (Table 2).
Air Cleaning Methods
Detailed information has been published regarding the se-
lection, design, maintenance, and safety considerations asso-
ciated with air cleaning methods (i.e., filtration and UVGI)
(71). Designers and end users should consult this informa-
tion. Air removed from areas likely to contain infectious aero-
sols (e.g., AII cells, sputum collection and other procedure
rooms, and intake areas) should be exhausted directly to the
outdoors to ensure that it cannot immediately reenter the
building or pose a hazard to persons outside, in accordance
with applicable federal, state, and local regulations. If discharg-
ing air to the outside is not feasible, HEPA filters should be
used to clean the air before returning to the general ventila-
tion system. Such recirculation is acceptable only if the air is
recirculated back into the same general area from which it
originated.
For general population areas in which infectious aerosols
are not anticipated but might be present (from persons with
undiagnosed TB disease), total exhaust ventilation should be
considered where and when the outdoor environmental con-
ditions (temperature and humidity) are compatible with a
single-pass system without undue energy or equipment costs.
When recirculating air from these areas, the minimum
ASHRAE-recommended level of filtration is a MERV-8 filter
(78). However, CDC encourages selection and use of filters
with higher MERV ratings to provide an incremental improve-
ment in the protection afforded by this mechanism. The fil-
tration system should be designed to prevent filter by-pass
and to allow filter leakage testing and safe filter changes. A
combination of air cleaning methods (e.g., MERV-rated fil-
ters and supplemental UVGI) may be used to increase effec-
tive air cleaning.
When used, UVGI should be applied in-duct (i.e., inside
the ductwork of existing HVAC systems) or in the upper room
of the area to be treated to ensure that organisms are inacti-
vated. Upper-air systems should be designed, installed, and
monitored to ensure both sufficient irradiation in the upper
room to inactivate M. tuberculosis and safe levels of UVGI in
the occupied space.
Environmental Control Maintenance
To be most effective, environmental controls should be
installed, operated, and maintained correctly. Ongoing main-
tenance should be part of any written TB infection-control
plan. The plan should outline the responsibility and author-
ity for maintenance and address staff training needs.
Failure to maintain environmental control systems prop-
erly has adversely impacted TB control and prevention efforts
at facilities throughout the United States. At one hospital,
improperly functioning ventilation controls were believed to
be a factor in the transmission of MDR TB disease to four
persons (three patients and a correctional officer), three of
whom died (80). In three other multihospital studies evaluat-
ing the performance of AII rooms, failure to routinely moni-
tor air-pressure differentials (whether manually or through use
of continuous monitoring devices) resulted in a substantial
percentage of the rooms being under positive pressure (81–84).
Correctional facilities should schedule routine preventive
maintenance that covers all components of the ventilation
systems (e.g., fans, filters, ducts, supply diffusers, and exhaust
grilles) and any air-cleaning devices in use. Performance moni-
toring should be conducted to verify that environmental con-
trols are operating as designed. Performance monitoring should
include 1) directional airflow assessments using smoke tubes
and use of pressure monitoring devices sensitive to pressures
at 0.001 inch of water gauge and 2) measurement of supply
and exhaust airflows to compare with recommended air change
rates for the respective areas of the facility. Records should be
kept to document all preventive maintenance and repairs.
Standard procedures should be established to ensure that
1) maintenance staff notify infection-control personnel
before performing maintenance on ventilation systems ser-
vicing inmate-care areas and 2) infection-control staff request
assistance from maintenance personnel in checking the
operational status of AII cells and local exhaust devices (e.g.,
booths, hoods, and tents) before use. A protocol that is well
written and followed will help to prevent unnecessary expo-
sures of correctional facility staff and inmates to infectious
aerosols. Proper labeling of ventilation system components
(e.g., ducts, fans, and filters) will help identify air-flow paths.
Clearly labeling which fan services a given area will help pre-
vent accidental shutdowns (85). In addition, provisions should
be made for emergency power to avoid interruptions in the
performance of essential environmental controls during a
power failure.
Respiratory Protection
Considerations for Selection
of Respirators
Respiratory protection is used when administrative (i.e.,
identification and isolation of infectious TB patients) and
environmental controls alone have not reduced the risk for
infection with M. tuberculosis to an acceptable level. The use
of respiratory protection is most appropriate in specific set-
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tings and situations within correctional facilities. For example,
protection is warranted for inmates and facility staff when
they enter AII rooms, transport infectious inmates, and par-
ticipate in cough-inducing procedures.
Respirators should be selected from those approved by CDC/
National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health
(NIOSH) under the provisions of Title 42, Part 84 of the
Code of Federal Regulations (86). Decisions regarding which
respirator is appropriate for a particular situation and setting
should be made on the basis of a risk assessment of the likeli-
hood for TB transmission.** For correctional facilities, a CDC/
NIOSH-approved N95 air-purifying respirator will provide
adequate respiratory protection in the majority of situations
that require the use of respirators. If a higher level of respira-
tory protection is warranted, additional information on other
classes of air-purifying respirators and powered air-purifying
respirators (PAPRs) is available (71). The overall effectiveness
of respiratory protection is affected by 1) the level of respira-
tory protection selected (i.e., the assigned protection factor),
2) the fitting characteristics of the respirator model, 3) the
care taken in donning the respirator, and 4) the effectiveness
of the respiratory protection program, including fit testing
and worker training.
Implementing a Respiratory Protection
Program
All facilities should develop, implement, and maintain a
respiratory-protection program for health-care workers or other
staff who use respiratory protection. Respiratory-protection
programs are required for facilities covered by the U.S. Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
(71,87–89). The key elements of a respiratory protection pro-
gram include 1) assignment of responsibility, 2) training, and
3) fit testing (71,87,90,91). All correctional facility staff who
use respirators for protection against infection with M.
tuberculosis must participate in the facility’s respiratory pro-
tection program (e.g., understand their responsibilities, receive
training, receive medical clearance, and engage in fit testing)
(71). In addition to staff members, visitors to inmates with
TB disease should be offered respirators to wear while in AII
rooms and instructed on proper use. Certain regular visitors
(e.g., law enforcement officials, social workers, ministers and
other religious representatives, and attorneys and other legal
staff ) might be there in an occupational capacity. Each facil-
ity, regardless of TB risk classification (i.e., minimal or
nonminimal), should develop a policy on the use of respira-
tors by visitors of patients.
Precautions for Transporting Patients
Between Correctional or Detention
Facilities
Recommended precautions to take when transporting
patients between facilities have been published (71). Patients
with suspected or confirmed infectious TB disease should be
transported in an ambulance whenever possible. The ambu-
lance ventilation system should be operated in the
nonrecirculating mode and the maximum amount of outdoor
air be provided to facilitate dilution. If the vehicle has a rear
exhaust fan, it should be used during transport. If the vehicle
is equipped with a supplemental recirculating ventilation unit
that passes air through HEPA filters before returning it to the
vehicle, this unit should be used to increase the number of
ACH. Airflow should be from the cab (i.e., front of vehicle)
over the patient and out the rear exhaust fan. If an ambulance
is not used, the ventilation system for the vehicle should bring
in as much outdoor air as possible, and the system should be
set to nonrecirculating. If possible, the cab should be physi-
cally isolated from the rest of the vehicle, and the patient should
be placed in the rear seat. Drivers or other persons who are
transporting patients with suspected or confirmed infectious
TB disease in an enclosed vehicle should wear at least an N95
disposable respirator. If the patient has signs or symptoms of
infectious TB disease (i.e., positive AFB sputum-smear result),
consideration might be given to having the patient wear a
surgical or procedure mask, if possible, during transport, in
waiting areas, or when others are present.
Diagnosis and Treatment
of Latent Tuberculosis Infection
and Tuberculosis Disease
The principles of diagnosis and treatment of LTBI and TB
disease discussed in this section are guidelines and not meant
to substitute for clinical experience and judgment. Medical
providers not familiar with the management of LTBI and TB
disease should consult a person with expertise. All facilities’
local operations procedures should include plans for consul-
tation with and referral to persons with expertise in TB and
should include criteria delineating when consultation and
referral are indicated.
Although the index of suspicion for TB disease varies by
individual risk factors and prevalence of TB in the population
** Surgical masks should never be worn in place of a respirator. Surgical masks
often fit so poorly that they provide only minimal protection from any
airborne hazard, including M. tuberculosis. Surgical masks are designed to
protect others from the wearer; they are not designed or tested to provide
respiratory protection to the wearer.
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served by the correctional facility, correctional facilities typi-
cally are considered higher-risk settings (see Screening).
A diagnosis of TB disease should be considered for any
patient who has a persistent cough (i.e., one lasting >3 weeks)
or other signs or symptoms compatible with TB disease (e.g.,
hemoptysis, night sweats, weight loss, anorexia, and fever).
Diagnostic tests for TB include the TST, QFT-G, chest radi-
ography, and laboratory examination of sputum samples or
other body tissues and fluids.
Persons exposed to inmates with TB disease might become
latently infected with M. tuberculosis depending on host
immunity and the degree and duration of exposure. There-
fore, the treatment of persons with TB disease plays a key role
in TB control by stopping transmission and preventing
potentially infectious cases from occurring (92). LTBI is an
asymptomatic condition that can be diagnosed by the TST or
QFT-G.
Interpreting TST Results
A baseline screening TST result of >10 mm induration is
considered positive for the majority of correctional facility staff
and inmates, and these persons should be referred for medical
and diagnostic evaluation. However, for correctional facility
staff and inmates who have had a known exposure in a correc-
tional facility (i.e., close contact with an inmate or staff mem-
ber with infectious TB disease) after having a previous
(baseline) TST value of 0 mm, TST results of >5 mm should
be considered positive and interpreted as a new infection. Cor-
rectional facility staff and inmates with a screening baseline
TST result of >1 mm, but <10 mm, who are subsequently
exposed to TB disease, should be considered newly infected if
they have TST values increase by >10 mm on retest (Table 3).
For example, a baseline TST result with 8 mm induration and
a repeat TST result 1 year later with 18 mm induration would
indicate a new infection. However, a repeat TST result with
12 mm induration would not indicate a new infection.
When decisions are made for the diagnosis and treatment
of LTBI and choosing the cut-off value for a positive reaction,
certain risk factors (e.g., immunocompromising conditions
and known contact with a TB patient) should be assessed.
Correctional facility staff and inmates who have TST indura-
tions of 5–9 mm should be advised that their results might be
an indication for treatment under certain conditions.
Special Considerations in Interpreting
the TST
Interpretation of the TST might be complicated by previ-
ous vaccination with BCG, anergy, and the “boosting” effect.
Detailed recommendations describing how the TST should
be interpreted in relation to these possible confounders have
been published (64,93).
Correctional Staff and Inmates
who Refuse Testing for M. tuberculosis
Infection
A correctional facility staff member or inmate who refuses
testing for M. tuberculosis infection should first be educated
regarding the importance of routine screening of correctional
facility staff and inmates. If the person continues to refuse to
have a TST, the option may be offered for the person to be
tested using the QFT-G test (and vice versa). The decision to
offer an alternative test depends on the reason for refusal and
should be consistent with the patient’s underlying wishes (e.g.,
offering QFT-G in place of TST is acceptable if the patient
objects to having injection of a substance but agrees to having
blood drawn).
TABLE 3. Criteria for evaluation of correctional facility staff and inmates with latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) for tuberculosis
(TB) disease, by test result
Purpose TST* result QFT-G† result
Baseline >10 mm§ (either first or second step) Positive single-step test result
Serial testing (no known exposure) Increase of >10 mm Change from negative to positive
Known exposure (close contact) >5 mm in those with a baseline TST of 0 mm Change from negative to positive
Increase of >10 mm in those with baseline or previous
follow-up screening TST result of <10 mm
* Tuberculin skin test.
†QuantiFERON®-TB Gold.
§Except for persons in whom a 5 mm induration test (TST) result is considered positive: 1) persons infected with human immunodeficiency virus,
2) persons who are recent contacts of patients with TB disease, 3) persons with fibrotic changes on chest radiograph consistent with previous TB
disease, 4) organ transplant recipients and patients with other immunocompromising conditions (e.g., persons receiving >15 mg/day of prednisone for
>1 month), and 5) persons suspected of having TB disease.
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Interpreting the QuantiFERON®-TB
Gold Test Data
Interpretation of QFT-G data is initially performed elec-
tronically; an approved interpretation method is automati-
cally performed by the software supplied by the manufacturer
(Table 4) (58). A complete description of the test’s interpreta-
tion is included in the product insert.
Persons who have a positive QFT-G result should be
referred for a medical and diagnostic evaluation. On serial
testing, a person with QFT-G results changing from negative
to positive should be referred for medical and diagnostic evalu-
ation and considered to be a QFT-G converter. Risk factors
(e.g., the facility’s prevalence of TB disease and personal risk
factors) should be assessed when making decisions about the
diagnosis and treatment of LTBI.
Interpreting Chest Radiographs
Persons with Suspected Pulmonary TB
Multiple types of abnormalities demonstrated on chest
radiographs are strongly suggestive of pulmonary TB disease,
including upper-lobe infiltration, cavitation, and pleural
effusion. Infiltrates can be patchy or nodular and observed in
the apical or subapical posterior upper lobes or superior seg-
ment of the lower lobes. If radiographic or clinical findings
are consistent with TB disease, further studies (e.g., medical
evaluation, mycobacteriologic examinations of sputa or tis-
sue, and comparison of current and prior chest radiographs)
should be performed (65). Persons with TB pleural effusions
might have concurrent unsuspected pulmonary or laryngeal
TB disease (94). These patients should be considered infec-
tious until pulmonary and laryngeal TB disease is excluded.
Patients with suspected extrapulmonary TB disease also should
be suspected of having pulmonary TB until concomitant pul-
monary disease is excluded.
The radiographic presentation of pulmonary TB in HIV-
infected persons might be atypical. Apical cavitary disease is
less common among such patients than HIV-negative patients.
More common findings among HIV-infected persons are
infiltrates in any lung zone, mediastinal or hilar adenopathy,
or, in rare cases, a normal chest radiograph (65,95–97).
Persons with LTBI
To exclude pulmonary TB disease, a chest radiograph is
indicated for all persons in whom LTBI is diagnosed. If chest
radiographs do not indicate pulmonary TB, and no symp-
toms consistent with TB disease are present, persons with
positive test results for TB infection should be considered for
treatment for LTBI. Persons with LTBI typically have normal
chest radiographs, although they might have abnormalities
suggestive of previous TB disease or other pulmonary condi-
tions. In certain patients with TB symptoms, pulmonary in-
filtrates might be apparent on chest computed tomography
scan or magnetic resonance imaging study but not on chest
radiograph. Previous, healed TB disease typically produces ra-
diographic findings that differ from those associated with cur-
rent TB disease. These findings include nodules, fibrotic scars,
calcified granulomas, and apical pleural thickening. Never-
theless, a chest radiograph by itself cannot be used to distin-
guish between current and healed TB. Nodules and fibrotic
scars might contain slowly multiplying tubercle bacilli and pose
substantial risk for progression to TB disease. Calcified nodular
lesions (i.e., calcified granulomas) and apical pleural thicken-
ing indicate lower risk for progression to TB disease (65).
Pregnant Women
Because TB disease is dangerous to both the mother and
the fetus, a pregnant woman who has a positive TST or
QFT-G result or who is suspected of having TB disease should
receive a chest radiograph (with shielding consistent with safety
guidelines) as soon as feasible. If symptoms or other high-risk
conditions (e.g., HIV infection) are identified, a chest radio-
graph might have to be performed during the first trimester
of pregnancy (64,65,98).
Evaluation of Sputum Samples
Sputum examination is a key diagnostic procedure for pul-
monary TB disease (93) and is indicated for the following
inmates and correctional facility staff:
• persons suspected of having pulmonary TB disease
because of a chest radiograph consistent with TB disease,
particularly those with any respiratory symptoms sugges-
tive of TB disease;
TABLE 4. QuantiFERON®-TB Gold (QFT-G) test results and
interpretation
Laboratory interpretation Clinical interpretation
Positive QFT-G test Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection likely;
medical evaluation indicated
Negative QFT-G test M. tuberculosis infection unlikely but
cannot be excluded, especially when
illness is consistent with tuberculosis (TB)
disease and likelihood of progression
to TB disease is increased
Indeterminate QFT-G test Not possible to determine likelihood of
M. tuberculosis infection from blood sample
supplied
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• persons with chest radiographic findings suggestive of
previous, healed TB disease;
• HIV-infected persons with any pulmonary symptoms
(regardless of chest radiograph findings); or
• persons suspected of having pulmonary TB disease for
which bronchoscopy is planned (all sputum specimens
should be collected and final results of staining for AFB
should have been reviewed before proceeding with bron-
choscopy [67]).
Specimen Collection
Persons requiring smear- and culture-sputum examination
should submit at least three sputum specimens (collected
8–24 hours apart, with at least one specimen collected in the
early morning) (71,99). Specimens should be collected in a
sputum induction booth or in an AII room. In resource-
limited settings without environmental containment, collec-
tion is safer when performed outdoors. Patients should be
instructed how to produce an adequate sputum specimen, and
a health-care professional should supervise and observe the
collection of sputum, if possible (93). For patients who are
unable to produce an adequate sputum specimen, expectora-
tion might be induced by inhalation of an aerosol of warm,
hypertonic saline (71).
Laboratory Examination
Detection of AFB in stained smears by microscopy can pro-
vide the first mycobacteriologic indication of TB disease. A
positive result for AFB in a sputum smear is predictive of
increased infectiousness; however, negative AFB sputum-smear
results do not exclude a diagnosis of TB disease if clinical sus-
picion is high. In 2002, only 63% of U.S. patients with
reported positive sputum cultures had positive AFB sputum
smears (100).
Although smears allow for the detection of mycobacteria,
definitive identification, strain typing, and drug-susceptibility
testing of M. tuberculosis can be performed only via culture
(93). A culture of sputum or other clinical specimen that con-
tains M. tuberculosis provides a definitive diagnosis of TB dis-
ease. In the majority of cases, identification of M. tuberculosis
and drug-susceptibility results are available within 28 days
using recommended rapid methods (e.g., liquid culture and
DNA probes). A negative culture result is obtained in approxi-
mately 14% of patients with confirmed pulmonary TB dis-
ease (100) . Testing sputum with certain techniques (e.g.,
nucleic acid amplification [NAA]) facilitates the rapid detec-
tion and identification of M. tuberculosis, but should not
replace culture and drug-susceptibility testing in patients with
suspected TB disease (88,101,102). Recommendations for use
and interpretation of NAA tests in the diagnosis of TB disease
have been published previously (101,102).
Laboratories should report positive smear results within
24 hours of collection and positive cultures within 24 hours
of the notation of the positive culture. Drug-susceptibility tests
should be performed on initial isolates from all patients to
assist in the identification of an effective anti-TB regimen.
Drug-susceptibility tests should be repeated if 1) sputum speci-
mens continue to be culture-positive 3 months after initia-
tion of treatment or if 2) persons whose cultures had converted
to negative subsequently revert to positive (65,93).
Treatment for LTBI
Treatment for LTBI is essential to controlling and eliminat-
ing TB disease in the United States because it substantially
reduces the risk that TB infection will progress to TB disease
(23). Certain persons are at high risk for developing TB dis-
ease once infected, and every effort should be made to begin
these persons on a standard LTBI treatment regimen and to
ensure that they complete the entire course of treatment for
LTBI . Before treatment for LTBI is started, TB disease should
be ruled out by history, medical examination, chest radiogra-
phy, and when indicated, mycobacteriologic studies.
Candidates for Treatment of LTBI
Correctional facility staff and inmates in the following high-
risk groups should be given treatment for LTBI if their reac-
tion to the TST is >5 mm, regardless of age (64,65):
• HIV-infected persons,
• recent contacts of a TB patient,
• persons with fibrotic changes on chest radiograph consis-
tent with previous TB disease, and
• patients with organ transplants and other immuno-
compromising conditions who receive the equivalent of
>15 mg/day of prednisone for >1 month.
All other correctional facility staff and inmates should be
considered for treatment of LTBI if their TST results are
>10 mm induration. If QFT-G is used, any correctional facil-
ity staff member or inmate with a positive QFT-G result should
be considered for LTBI treatment. Decisions regarding initia-
tion of LTBI treatment should include consideration of the
likelihood of the patient continuing and completing LTBI
treatment under supervision if released from the facility
before the treatment regimen is completed.
Persons with previously positive TST results who have pre-
viously completed treatment for LTBI (i.e., >6 months of iso-
niazid, 4 months of rifampin, or another regimen) do not
need to be treated again unless concern exists that reinfection
has occurred. Other persons who might be poor candidates
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for treatment of LTBI include those with a previous history of
liver injury or a history of excessive alcohol consumption;
active hepatitis and end-stage liver disease are relative contra-
indications to the use of isoniazid or pyrazinamide for treat-
ment of LTBI (64,103). If the decision is made to treat such
patients, baseline and follow-up monitoring of serum
aminotransaminases are recommended.
Treatment Regimens for LTBI
Standard regimens have been developed for the treatment
of LTBI (Table 5). The preferred treatment for LTBI is
9 months of daily isoniazid or biweekly dosing administered
by DOT. Although regimens are broadly applicable, modifi-
cations should be considered for certain populations (e.g.,
patients with HIV infection) and when drug resistance is sus-
pected.
Reports of severe liver injury and death associated with the
combination of rifampin and pyrazinamide for treatment of
LTBI prompted ATS and CDC to revise previous recommen-
dations. These recommendations now state that this regimen
typically should not be offered for the treatment of LTBI
(64,103–107). If the potential benefits substantially outweigh
the demonstrated risk for severe liver injury and death associ-
ated with this regimen and the patient has no contraindications
this regimen may be considered; a physician with experience
treating LTBI and TB disease should be consulted before use
of this regimen (103). Clinicians should continue the appro-
priate use of rifampin and pyrazinamide in standard multidrug
anti-TB regimens for the treatment of TB disease (65).
For all LTBI treatment regimens, nonadherence to inter-
mittent dosing results in a larger proportion of total doses
missed than daily dosing; therefore, all patients on intermit-
tent treatment should receive DOT. In addition, DOT should
be used with daily dosing of LTBI treatment whenever fea-
sible. Patients with the highest priority for DOT are those at
the highest risk for progression from LTBI to TB disease,
including persons with HIV infection and persons who are
recent contacts of infectious patients with pulmonary TB.
Contacts of Patients with
Drug-Susceptible TB Disease
Contacts of patients with drug-susceptible TB disease who
once tested negative but subsequently have a positive TST
result (i.e., >5 mm) should be evaluated for treatment of LTBI.
The majority of persons who are infected will have a positive
TST result within 6 weeks of exposure; therefore, contacts of
patients with drug-susceptible TB disease who have initial
negative TSTs should be retested 8–10 weeks after the end of
exposure to a patient with suspected or confirmed TB disease
(108). Persons with TB infection should be advised that they
can be re-infected with M. tuberculosis if re-exposed (109–111).
If they have not been treated previously, HIV-infected per-
sons (regardless of TST result or previous LTBI treatment his-
tory), persons receiving immunosuppressive therapy (regardless
of TST result or previous LTBI treatment history), and per-
sons with a known previous (to current exposure) positive
TST also should be considered for LTBI treatment.
Treatment of LTBI should not be started until a diagnosis
of TB disease has been excluded. If the presence of TB disease
is uncertain because of an equivocal chest radiograph, a stan-
dard multidrug anti-TB therapy might be started and adjusted
as necessary, depending on the results of sputum cultures, drug-
susceptibility tests, and clinical response (65). If cultures are
obtained without initiating therapy for TB disease, treatment
for LTBI should not be initiated until all cultures are reported
as negative, which might take 6–8 weeks.
Contacts of Patients with Drug-Resistant
TB Disease
Treatment for LTBI caused by drug-resistant M. tuberculosis
organisms is complex and should be conducted in consulta-
tion with the local health department’s TB control program
and persons with expertise in the medical management of drug-
resistant TB. Often this will require waiting for results of sus-
ceptibility testing of the isolate from the presumed source
TABLE 5. Common drug regimens for treatment of latent
tuberculosis infection (LTBI)*
Duration No. of Rating (evidence)
†
Drugs (mos) Interval doses HIV–§ HIV+¶
Isoniazid 9 Daily 270 A (II) A (II)
Twice wkly 78 B (II) B (II)
Isoniazid 6 Daily 180 B (I) C (I)
Twice wkly 52 B (II) C (I)
Rifampin** 4 Daily 120 B (II) B (III)
* The combination of rifampin and pyrazinamide had been recommended
for the treatment of LTBI (American Thoracic Society, CDC. Targeted
tuberculin testing and treatment of latent tuberculosis infection. Am J
Respir Crit Care Med 2000;161:S221–47). However, this regimen
should generally not be offered (a D [III] recommendation) on the basis
of subsequent reports of severe hepatotoxicity.
† Ratings are based on modification of the U.S. Public Health Service
rating system (American Thoracic Society, CDC. Targeted tuberculin
testing and treatment of latent tuberculosis infection. Am J Respir Crit
Care Med 2000;161:S221–47. A = preferred; B = acceptable alterna-
tive; C = offer when A and B cannot be given. I = randomized clinical
trial data; II = data from clinical trials that are not randomized or were
conducted in other populations; III = expert opinion.
§ Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)–negative.
¶ HIV-infected.
** Substitution of rifabutin for rifampin might be indicated in HIV-infected
patents taking certain antiretroviral medications because drug-drug
interaction might be less frequent when rifabutin is used.
20 MMWR July 7, 2006
patient. Treatment should be guided by in vitro susceptibility
test results from the isolate to which the patient was exposed
(65,112,113).
Pretreatment Evaluation and
Monitoring of Treatment
Routine laboratory monitoring during treatment of LTBI
is indicated only for patients with abnormal baseline tests and
for persons at risk for hepatic disease. Baseline laboratory test-
ing is indicated only for persons infected with HIV, pregnant
women, women in the immediate postpartum period (typi-
cally within 3 months of delivery), persons with a history of
liver disease, persons who use alcohol regularly, and persons
who have or who are at risk for chronic liver disease (64).
All patients should undergo clinical monitoring at least
monthly. This monitoring should include 1) a brief clinical
assessment regarding the signs of hepatitis (i.e., nausea, vom-
iting, abdominal pain, jaundice, and yellow or brown urine)
and 2) education about the adverse effects of the drug(s) and
the need for prompt cessation of treatment and clinical evalu-
ation should adverse effects occur. All aspects of the clinical
encounter should be conducted in private and in the patient’s
primary language.
Severe adverse events associated with the administration of
tuberculin antigen or treatment of LTBI or TB disease (e.g.,
those resulting in hospitalization or death) should be reported
to MedWatch, FDA’s Safety Information and Adverse Event
Reporting Program at telephone 800-FDA-1088, by facsimile
at 800-FDA-0178, or via the Internet by sending Report Form
3500 (available at http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/safety/
3500.pdf ). Instructions regarding the types of adverse events
that should be reported are included on MedWatch report
forms. In addition, severe adverse effects associated with LTBI
treatment should be reported to CDC’s Division of Tubercu-
losis Elimination at telephone 404-639-8118.
Treatment for TB Disease
A decision to initiate treatment (i.e., combination anti-TB
chemotherapy) should be made on the basis of epidemiologic
information; clinical, pathological, and radiographic findings;
and the results of microscopic examination of AFB-stained
sputum smears and cultures for mycobacteria. A positive AFB-
smear result provides strong inferential evidence for the diag-
nosis of TB, and combination chemotherapy should be
initiated promptly unless other strong evidence against the
diagnosis of TB disease is present (e.g., a negative NAA test).
If the diagnosis is confirmed by isolation of M. tuberculosis or
a positive NAA test, treatment should be continued until a
standard course of therapy is completed. Because as few as
50% of patients with positive sputum culture results for
M. tuberculosis will have negative sputum AFB-smear results
(93), when initial AFB-smear results are negative, empiric
therapy for TB is indicated if the clinical suspicion for TB
disease is high. Regardless of the decision to begin anti-TB
treatment, diagnoses other than TB should be considered and
appropriate evaluations undertaken in patients with negative
AFB-smear results. A diagnosis of culture-negative pulmonary
TB can be made if sputum cultures are negative, the TST
result is positive (in this circumstance, a reaction of >5 mm
induration is considered positive), a clinical or radiographic
response is observed 2 months after the initiation of therapy,
and no other diagnosis has been established. An adequate regi-
men for culture-negative pulmonary TB includes an additional
2 months of isoniazid and rifampin to complete 4 months of
treatment (65). If no clinical or radiographic response is
observed by 2 months, treatment can be stopped, and other
diagnoses (including inactive TB) should be considered. If
AFB-smear results are negative, and suspicion for TB disease
is low, treatment can be deferred until the results of mycobac-
terial cultures are known and a comparison chest radiograph
is available (typically at 2 months). Among persons who have
not begun treatment and in whom suspicion of TB is low,
treatment of LTBI should be considered if 1) cultures are nega-
tive, 2) the TST result is positive (>5 mm induration), and 3)
the chest radiograph is unchanged after 2 months. A person
with TB expertise should be consulted for unusual or com-
plex situations.
Individualized case management should be provided for all
patients with TB disease (114–116). In addition, patient man-
agement should be coordinated with officials of the local or
state health department; suspected or confirmed TB cases
should be reported to the local or state health department in
accordance with laws and regulations. Regimens for treating
TB disease should contain multiple drugs to which the
organisms are susceptible. For persons with TB disease, treat-
ment with a single drug can lead to the development of myco-
bacterial resistance to that drug. Similarly, adding a single drug
to a failing anti-TB regimen is not recommended because it
can lead to resistance to the added drug (65).
For the majority of patients, the preferred regimen for treat-
ing TB disease consists of an initial 2-month phase of isoniazid,
rifampin, pyrazinamide, and ethambutol, followed by a con-
tinuation phase of isoniazid and rifampin lasting >4 months,
for a minimum total treatment period of 6 months (Tables 6
and 7). The decision to stop therapy should be made on the
basis of the number of doses taken within a maximum period
(not simply a 6-month period) (65). Persons with cavitary pul-
monary TB disease and positive cultures of sputum specimens
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at the completion of 2 months of therapy should receive a longer,
7-month continuation phase of therapy (total duration:
9 months) because of the substantially higher rate of relapse
among persons with this type of TB disease (65).
If interruptions in TB therapy occur, the decision should be
made whether to restart a complete course of treatment or
continue the regimen as originally intended. In the majority
of instances, the earlier the break in therapy and the longer its
duration, the more serious the effect and the greater the need
to restart the treatment from the beginning. Continuous treat-
ment is more important in the initial phase of therapy, when
the bacillary burden is highest and the chance of developing
drug resistance is greatest. Although no evidence on which to
base detailed recommendations exists, examples of practical
algorithms for managing interruptions in therapy have been
described previously (65).
For HIV-infected persons who are receiving antiretroviral
therapy, TB treatment regimens might need to be altered.
Whenever possible, the care of persons with concomitant TB
and HIV should be provided by or in consultation with per-
sons with expertise in the management of both TB and HIV-
related disease (65). To prevent the emergence of rifampin
resistance, persons with TB, HIV, and CD4+ T-lymphocyte
cell counts <100 cells/mm3 should not be treated with highly
intermittent (i.e., once- or twice-weekly) regimens. These
patients should instead receive daily therapy during the
intensive phase (i.e., first 2 months) and receive daily dosing
or 3 doses per week by DOT during the continuation phase
(117). Antiretroviral therapy should not be withheld because
the patient is being treated for TB if it is otherwise indicated.
Nevertheless, beginning both antiretroviral therapy and com-
bination chemotherapy for TB at nearly the same time is not
advisable. Although data on which to base recommendations
are limited, experience in the fields of HIV and TB suggests
that treatment for TB should be initiated first. Delaying the
initiation of antiretroviral therapy until 4–8 weeks after start-
ing anti-TB therapy is advantageous because it 1) better
enables providers to ascribe a specific cause to a drug side
effect, 2) decreases the severity of paradoxical reactions, and
TABLE 6. Initial drug regimens for culture-positive pulmonary
tuberculosis caused by drug-susceptible organisms
Minimum
Regimen Drug Interval Dose duration
1 Isoniazid Daily 56 8 wks
Rifampin*
Pyrazinamide
Ethambutol†
2 Isoniazid Daily, then 14 daily, then 2 wks daily,
Rifampin* twice wkly§ 12 twice wkly then 6 wks
Pyrazinamide twice wkly
Ethambutol†
Other See source cited below for less commonly used regimens.
SOURCE: Modified from American Thoracic Society, CDC, Infectious
Diseases Society of America. Treatment of tuberculosis. MMWR 2003;
52(No. RR-11):1–80.
* Substitution of rifabutin for rifampin might be indicated in human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV)–infected patients taking certain
antiretroviral medications because drug-drug interaction might be less
frequent when rifabutin is used.
†May be discontinued if the infecting organism is confirmed to be
susceptible to isoniazid and rifampin.
§Not recommended for HIV-infected patients with CD4+ T-lymphocyte
cell counts of <100 cells/mm3. Additional information is available at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/tb_hiv_drugs/toc.htm.
TABLE 7. Continuation phase options for initial drug regimens 1 and 2
Rating (evidence)†
Regimen Option Drugs Interval Doses Minimum duration* HIV–§ HIV+¶
1 a Isoniazid Daily 126 18 wks A (I) A (II)
Rifampin**
1 b Isoniazid Twice wkly†† 36 18 wks A (I) A (II)
Rifampin**
2 a Isoniazid Twice wkly†† 36 18 wks A (II) B (II)
Rifampin**
Other Refer to American Thoracic Society, CDC, Infectious Diseases Society of America. Treatment of tuberculosis. MMWR 2003;52
(No. RR-11):1-80 for less commonly used options.
SOURCE: Modified from American Thoracic Society, CDC, Infectious Diseases Society of America. Treatment of tuberculosis. MMWR 2003;52(No. RR-11):1–80.
* Patients with cavitation on initial chest radiograph and positive cultures at completion of 2 months of therapy should receive a 7-month (31 wks; either
217 doses [daily] or 62 doses [twice wkly]) continuation phase.
† Ratings are based on modification of the U.S. Public Health Service rating system (American Thoracic Society, CDC, Infectious Diseases Society of
America. Treatment of tuberculosis. MMWR 2003;52(No. RR-11):1–80). A = preferred; B = acceptable alternative; C = offer when A and B cannot be given.
I = randomized clinical trial data; II = data from clinical trials that are not randomized or were conducted in other populations; III = expert opinion.
§ Human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)–negative.
¶ HIV-infected.
** Substitution of rifabutin for rifampin might be indicated in HIV-infected patents taking certain antiretroviral medications because drug-drug interaction
may be less frequent.
†† Not recommended for HIV-infected patients with CD4+ T-lymphocyte cell counts <100 cells/mm3. Additional information is available at http://www.cdc.gov/
nchstp/tb/tb_hiv_drugs/toc.htm.
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3) decreases adherence challenges for the patient. Until con-
trolled studies have been conducted that evaluate the optimal
time for starting antiretroviral therapy in patients with HIV
infection and TB, this decision should be individualized on
the basis of 1) the patient’s initial response to treatment for
TB, 2) the occurrence of side effects, and 3) the availability of
multidrug antiretroviral therapy. Because drug-drug interac-
tions might be less frequent with use of rifabutin, substitu-
tion of rifabutin for rifampin might be indicated with certain
antiretroviral medications. Detailed information on TB treat-
ment in HIV-infected persons has been published (65,107).
Updates are posted on the Internet as new findings become
available (at http://www.dhfs.state.wi.us/aids-hiv/resources/
overviews/aids_hiv.htm, http://www.hiv-druginteractions.org,
and http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/tb_hiv_drugs/toc.htm).
Drug-susceptibility testing should be performed on all initial
isolates from patients with TB disease. When results from drug-
susceptibility tests become available, the treatment regimen
should be adjusted accordingly (65,113,114,118,119)
(Tables 6 and 7). Medical providers treating patients with drug-
resistant TB disease should seek expert consultation and
collaborate with the local health department for treatment
decisions (65).
The primary determinant of treatment outcome is patient
adherence to the drug regimen. Thus, careful attention should
be paid to measures designed to enable and foster adherence
(65,119,120). DOT is the preferred treatment strategy for all
persons with TB disease and high-risk (e.g., HIV infected)
persons with LTBI. DOT should be used throughout the
entire course of therapy whenever feasible. Practitioners pro-
viding treatment to inmates should coordinate DOT with the
local health department on an inmate’s release. The local health
department also may be involved in monitoring therapy for
correctional facility staff (65).
Challenges to Treatment Completion
Achieving completion of treatment for LTBI or TB disease
often is difficult, particularly in correctional facilities. Movement
of inmates both within and outside of correctional systems inter-
feres with continuity of care and might lead to treatment default
(121). Comprehensive case management that includes discharge
planning and coordination with other correctional facilities and
health departments is needed to ensure completion of therapy
for patients with TB disease and LTBI (42).
Multiple studies have demonstrated that inmates have rela-
tively low LTBI treatment completion rates, particularly those
in jails who are likely to be released before their therapy has
been completed (14,28,40,122). For a substantial proportion
of inmates, referrals for follow-up after release are not made;
of inmates whose appointments are scheduled, 40%–60% will
not attend their first clinic visit (36,40). Multiple interven-
tions have been attempted to improve LTBI treatment comple-
tion in this population, including patient education while in
jail, use of incentives, and use of DOT (61,122,123). None
of these strategies has had substantial success, although
patient education and use of DOT have increased comple-
tion rates modestly in certain situations (61,122). Active case
management, as recommended for TB disease, should be con-
sidered as a next step in improving the completion rates for
LTBI treatment (14,42).
Discharge Planning
Correctional facilities should plan for the discharge of
inmates and other detainees who have confirmed or suspected
TB disease and those with LTBI who are at high risk for TB
disease. Such planning is crucial to effective local TB control
efforts within the community to which released inmates return.
Facilities should ensure that their discharge plan is compre-
hensive and effective; the process should include 1) collabo-
rating with public health and other community health-care
professionals, 2) ensuring continuity of case-management, and
3) evaluating discharge-planning procedures and modifying
procedures as needed to improve outcomes.
Collaboration Between Correction
Facilities and Public Health Officials
Postconfinement follow-up is a necessary component of
TB-control efforts (35,124). Effective discharge planning
requires collaboration between corrections and medical staff
(both intra- and inter-facility), and with public health and
community-based service organizations (37). Correctional
facilities and public health departments should overcome mul-
tiple obstacles associated with postdetention follow-up (125),
including
• short length of stay in a facility;
• unscheduled release or transfer;
• poorly defined or implemented channels of communica-
tion between correctional and public health authorities;
• limited resources (i.e., staff, equipment, and medications)
available to provide recommended TB prevention, screen-
ing, treatment, and discharge-planning services;
• limited resources of the patient to make or keep appoint-
ments;
• high prevalence of mental illness and substance abuse
among correctional patients;
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• mistrust among inmates, which might result in the provi-
sion of aliases or incorrect contact or locating informa-
tion; and
• reincarceration with disruption in treatment or termina-
tion of public benefits.
Collaboration is essential to ensure that TB-control efforts
are undertaken in the most cost-effective manner. Coordina-
tion between the correctional facility and the public health
department maximizes the effectiveness of any efforts begun
in a correctional facility (126), and linking released detainees
to the public health-care system might improve post-release
adherence (35) and reduce recidivism (127,128). The types
of relationships forged will depend on the assessment of the
TB risk in the facility and the community.
Comprehensive Discharge Planning
Comprehensive discharge planning is an important com-
ponent of case management and is essential for ensuring the
continuity of TB management and therapy among persons
with TB disease and LTBI. Following release, former inmates
face housing, employment, and other crises concerning basic
needs that often take priority over their health. Multiple
reports from the United States and other countries support
the use of comprehensive discharge planning in TB control
efforts (42,129,130). Comprehensive discharge planning
should be implemented for inmates with confirmed TB dis-
ease, suspected TB disease, and LTBI who also are at high risk
for TB disease.
Discharge planning for persons with LTBI who are consid-
ered at high risk for developing TB disease is critical if treat-
ment is begun in the correctional facility. Starting all inmates at
high risk on LTBI therapy might not be feasible while they are
in the correctional facility, and the policy determining which
risk groups to start on treatment should be made in collabora-
tion with public health personnel. Collaboration ensures
appropriate communication and adequate resources for treat-
ment after transfer to another facility or after release to the com-
munity. At minimum, all inmates who have begun therapy for
LTBI in a correctional facility should be given community con-
tact information for follow-up and continuity of care. Ideally,
all inmates demonstrated to be infected with TB should be con-
sidered for therapy, and discharge planning to facilitate therapy
should be comprehensive (124). Because of high recidivism rates,
discharge-planning efforts should begin in the detention phase
and continue in the post-detention phase to ensure continuity
of care as inmates move among different facilities and between
correctional facilities and the community.
Components of Discharge Planning
Initiate Discharge Planning Early
To ensure uninterrupted treatment, discharge planning for
inmates who receive a diagnosis of TB disease should begin as
soon as possible after diagnosis (131). Corrections or health
services administrators (or their designees) should assign staff
to notify the public health department of inmates receiving
treatment for TB disease or LTBI. Inmates with TB disease
should be interviewed while still incarcerated (ideally by pub-
lic health staff ) to enable facility administrators to assess and
plan for the appropriate support and referrals that will be
needed after discharge (131). Such personnel also should com-
municate with other facilities in the event of transfers of
inmates.
Provide Case Management
To ensure continuity of care, all correctional facilities should
assign personnel (preferably health-care professionals) to serve
as case managers. These managers should be responsible for
conducting discharge planning in the facility, which entails
coordinating follow-up and communicating treatment histo-
ries with public health department and other health-care coun-
terparts within the community (42). In addition, case managers
should employ strategies (e.g., mental-illness triage and refer-
ral, substance-abuse assessment and treatment, and prerelease
appointments for medical care) to help former inmates meet
basic survival needs on release. The role of case manager should
be assigned to a facility staff member who is capable of estab-
lishing good rapport with inmates; an effective case manager
might be capable of persuading TB patients who are being
released into the community to supply accurate information
needed to ensure follow-up care.
The following factors should be considered when planning
community discharge of an inmate receiving treatment for
TB (132):
• Where will the ex-inmate reside after discharge (e.g., a
permanent residence, a halfway house, or a shelter)?
• Will family or other support be available?
• Are cultural or language barriers present?
• What kind of assistance will be needed (e.g., housing,
social services, substance abuse services, mental health
services, medical services, and HIV/AIDS services)?
• Does the inmate understand the importance of follow-
up and know how to access health-care services?
Obtain Detailed Contact Information
To facilitate the process of locating former inmates, detailed
information should be collected from all inmates with TB
disease or LTBI for whom release is anticipated, including
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1) names, addresses, and telephone numbers of friends, rela-
tives, and landlords; 2) anticipated place of residence; and
3) areas typically frequented (e.g., restaurants, gyms, parks,
and community centers) (61,133). Inmates also should com-
plete a release form authorizing health department personnel
to contact worksites, family members, corrections staff
(parole officers), and public and private treatment centers.
Inmates might give aliases or incorrect contact information
because of fear of incrimination or deportation. The use of an
alias can be a barrier to continuity of care on reentry to a
correctional facility.
Assess and Plan for Substance Abuse
and Mental Health Treatment and
for Other Social Services
Substance abuse and other comorbid mental health condi-
tions should be considered when developing a comprehensive
discharge plan. Addiction affects health care, medication
adherence, housing opportunities, social relationships, and
employment and might be the greatest barrier to continuity
of care for TB (134). Mental illness can be a barrier when
community service providers have not been trained to inter-
act with mentally ill patients. Persons who are mentally ill
might have difficulties keeping medical appointments. Col-
laboration between corrections and health department per-
sonnel can facilitate the placement of former inmates in
substance abuse or mental-health treatment programs to
improve the likelihood of social stabilization and continuity
of care (134,135).
Other social issues present barriers to released inmates. Loss
of health insurance benefits while incarcerated is common,
and former inmates might be required to wait 30–365 days
after release to become re-eligible for benefits (136,137). Cer-
tain correctional facilities have agreements with local Social
Security Administration field offices to facilitate swift reacti-
vation of these benefits (138); creation of and training in the
use of such agreements are encouraged. Ideally, on entry into
the correctional system, public benefits would be suspended,
rather than terminated, and reactivated on release to elimi-
nate gaps in coverage. Application for public benefits and
insurance should be incorporated into the discharge planning
phase whenever possible. If the inmate is likely to have lim-
ited access to care because of inability to pay for services on
release, documentation should be made and another treat-
ment mechanism identified (139).
Make Arrangements for Postrelease
Follow-Up
Before release, the inmate should be introduced (preferably
face to face) to the employee from the community treatment
agency who is responsible for community-based treatment and
care (139). When release dates are known, setting post-release
appointments has been demonstrated to improve compliance
(128,134,140). Patients with TB disease should be given a sup-
ply of medication at discharge adequate to last until their next
medical appointment. Discharge planners can work with advo-
cacy groups or private or government-funded programs to
facilitate a safe, supported transition into the community (61).
Make Provisions for Unplanned Release
and Unplanned Transfers
Administrative procedures should be in place for unsched-
uled discharge of inmates who are being managed or treated
for TB (36,141). Reporting requirements for inmates with
TB disease who are released or transferred to another facility
vary among states and jurisdictions. Despite mandatory noti-
fication policies, notification of public health officials varies
from 87%–92% for inmates with TB disease (37,126) to only
17% for inmates with LTBI (36,37). Correctional facility staff
responsible for health department notification should relay
information about all scheduled and unscheduled releases as
it becomes available. All TB information concerning persons
who are being transferred to other correctional settings should
be provided to the receiving facility. In addition, inmates
should be given a written summary or discharge card outlin-
ing their treatment plan to ensure continuity of care in case of
unplanned and unanticipated release (131,142). Inmates with
TB disease who are eligible for release or transfer to another
medical or correctional facility but continue to be infectious
should remain in airborne precautions during and after trans-
fer until noninfectious (132).
Provide Education and Counseling
Patient education and documentation of education in the
correctional facility is critical; multiple misconceptions per-
sist among inmates and facility staff regarding means of trans-
mission, differences between infection and disease, and
methods of prevention and treatment for TB (143). Persons
receiving treatment should be counseled about the importance
of adhering to the treatment plan (131) as a measure to
improve postrelease follow-up (61). Education should be
delivered in the inmate’s first preferred language and should
be culturally sensitive with respect to ethnicity, sex, and age
(135,144–147). The inmate should be actively involved in all
education sessions to encourage communication regarding
previous transition experiences (e.g., the inmate’s treatment
motivations and any positive or negative experiences with spe-
cific providers) (141). Inmates with LTBI who have not been
started on therapy should be counseled on their risk factors,
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encouraged to visit the public health department, and pro-
vided with information about access to care after release.
DOT
DOT for TB disease or LTBI in the correctional setting
provides an opportunity for educating and counseling inmates
and for establishing a routine of medication administration.
The effect, if any, of DOT on postrelease behavior has not
been evaluated formally, but this practice might enhance
adherence (122).
Community-Based Case Management
after Release
Case-management strategies begun in the correctional
facility should be continued after release for former inmates
with confirmed or suspected TB disease and those with LTBI
who are at high risk for progression to TB disease. Incentives
and enablers (see Glossary) have improved adherence in
incarcerated (35,60,61) and nonincarcerated (148,149) popu-
lations, and incentives combined with education and coun-
seling optimize both short- and long-term adherence
(40,60,61,150). Case management that takes into account
cultural differences and addresses not only TB-control mat-
ters but patient-defined needs (particularly among foreign-
born persons) results in improved completion rates for LTBI
therapy (145). Case management by health department per-
sonnel after release is critical for continuity of care in the event
of reincarceration. The provision of follow-up information
from local health departments and community-based organi-
zations back to corrections staff is helpful in determining
whether discharge planning is effective.
Discharge Planning for Immigration
and Customs Enforcement Detainees
Background
Persons with TB disease detained by ICE officers are a
potential public health threat because they typically are highly
mobile, likely to leave and reenter the United States before
completion of TB therapy, and at high risk for interrupting
treatment (151). Therefore, ensuring treatment of such
detainees is important to the national strategy to eliminate
TB in the United States (32,152).
In March 2003, the detention and removal functions of the
former Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were
transferred from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). ICE is a
division of DHS and detains approximately 200,000 persons
annually while enforcing immigration law. ICE detainees are
screened for TB disease at service processing centers, staging
facilities, contract detention facilities, and local jails. Frequent
transfers of ICE detainees between detention facilities are
common.
ICE detention provides an opportunity to identify persons
with confirmed and suspected TB disease and initiate treat-
ment, if appropriate. ICE detainees with confirmed or sus-
pected TB disease receive treatment while they are in custody.
Presently, ICE does not deport detainees with known infec-
tious TB, but such persons might be deported when noncon-
tagious, even if treatment has not been completed or the final
culture and susceptibility results are pending.
Discharge Planning for ICE Detainees
In May 2004, ICE approved a policy to implement a short-
term medical hold of persons with suspected or confirmed TB
disease until continuity of care is arranged, which affords the
ICE health services program the time needed to facilitate conti-
nuity of TB therapy arrangements before the patient’s release or
removal. The ICE health services program seeks to enroll all
persons with confirmed or suspected TB disease in programs
that facilitate the continuity of TB therapy between countries.
These programs (e.g., CureTB, TB Net, and the U.S.-Mexico
Binational Tuberculosis Referral and Case Management Project)
facilitate TB referrals and follow-up for patients who move
between the United States and other countries.
ICE field office directors may consider a stay of removal for
persons with MDR TB or other complicated cases, so they
can receive and complete treatment in the United States
before removal. In detention settings in which ICE detainees
are held, facility staff who are responsible for TB communica-
tion should notify the ICE health services program of persons
with confirmed or suspected TB disease. Collaboration with
detention facilities and local and state health departments will
facilitate enrollment in the appropriate continuity of care pro-
gram before transfer, release, or repatriation. Correctional
facility staff should identify these patients as ICE detainees
when reporting TB cases to local and state health departments.
Evaluation of Discharge Planning
Effectiveness
Evaluation of a discharge planning program is critical and
should begin with an assessment of existing programs and
activities. Program evaluation should be incorporated into the
overall correctional quality improvement/assurance program
(153). Data from program evaluation studies should be docu-
mented and published to ensure that correctional facility and
public health department staff are informed regarding effec-
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tive measures and the effective translation of research findings
into practice (123). Evaluation of discharge planning should
include measurements of
• adherence to therapy,
• cost savings (from unduplicated testing for persons with LTBI
and completion of care without re-starts and extensions),
• recidivism, and
• the effectiveness of the collaboration between medical and
corrections staff (both within and among facilities) and
between correctional facilities and the public health
department and other community agencies.
Contact Investigation
Overview
Multiple outbreaks of TB, including those involving MDR
TB, have been reported in prisons and jails, particularly among
HIV-infected inmates (17,22,45,154). The identification of
a potentially infectious case of TB in a correctional facility
should always provoke a rapid response because of the poten-
tial for widespread TB transmission. A prompt public health
response in a confined setting can prevent a TB outbreak or
contain one that has already begun (16,21,155).
The overall goal of a TB contact investigation is to inter-
rupt transmission of M. tuberculosis. Ongoing transmission is
prevented by 1) identifying, isolating, and treating persons
with TB disease (source and secondary-case patients) and 2)
identifying infected contacts of the source patient and sec-
ondary patients and providing them with a complete course
of treatment for LTBI. The contact investigation can serve to
educate corrections staff and inmates about the risk, treat-
ment, and prevention of TB in correctional facilities; inform
staff and inmates regarding the importance of engaging in
recommended TB-control practices and procedures within the
correctional system; and emphasize the importance of comple-
tion of therapy for persons with TB disease and LTBI.
Because decisions involved in planning and prioritizing con-
tact investigations in correctional facilities are seldom simple,
a multidisciplinary team is preferable. Health departments
often can help correctional facilities in planning, implement-
ing, and evaluating a TB contact investigation.
Data collection and management is an essential component
of a successful investigation (21,36). It requires a systematic
approach to collecting, organizing, and analyzing TB-
associated data. As part of the contact investigation, all staff
and investigation personnel should adopt a uniform approach.
Investigators should have a clear understanding of how a con-
tact is defined and what constitutes an exposure (156–158).
Two correctional information systems are critical to the
efficient conduct of a contact investigation: 1) an inmate medi-
cal record system containing TST results and other relevant
information and 2) an inmate tracking system. The lack of
either system can lead to the unnecessary use of costly person-
nel time and medical evaluation resources (e.g., TSTs and chest
radiographs). Without these information systems, facilities also
might be forced to implement costly lockdowns and mass
screenings.
TB Transmission Factors
TB transmission is determined by the characteristics of the
source patient and exposed contacts; the circumstances sur-
rounding the exposure itself also determine whether ongoing
transmission will occur. The following variables should be
accounted for when planning each contact investigation.
Characteristics of the Source Patient
Source patients who have either cavitation on chest radio-
graph or AFB smear-positive respiratory specimens are sub-
stantially more likely to transmit TB than persons who have
neither characteristic (159–163) Delays in TB diagnosis in
source patients have also been associated with an increased
likelihood of transmission (164). Nonetheless, substantial vari-
ability exists among the infectiousness of a given TB source
patient. Although AFB smear status, cavitary disease, and
delayed diagnosis increase the likelihood of transmission, cer-
tain persons with these characteristics infect few persons,
whereas others with none of these characteristics might infect
multiple persons. The best measure of the infectiousness of
source patients is the documented infection rate among their
contacts.
Characteristics of Persons Who Have Been
Identified as Contacts
Immunosuppression. HIV infection is the greatest single
risk factor for progression to TB disease. Therefore, HIV-
infected contacts should receive the highest priority for evalua-
tion of TB infection, even if these persons had shorter duration
of exposure than other contacts. Persons receiving prolonged
therapy with corticosteroids, chemotherapy for cancer, or other
immunosuppressive agents (e.g., TNF-α antagonists) also
should be considered high priority for investigation. In addi-
tion, persons with end-stage renal disease and diabetes mellitus
should be promptly evaluated, because these conditions are as-
sociated with compromised immune function.
Age. Young children (i.e., those aged <4 years) are at high
risk for rapid development of TB disease, particularly TB
meningitis. If an inmate with TB identifies a young child as a
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community contact, a health department referral should be
made immediately.
Exposure Characteristics
Air volume. The volume of air shared between an infec-
tious TB patient and susceptible contacts is a major determi-
nant of the likelihood of transmission. Infectious particles
become more widely distributed as air space increases, ren-
dering them less likely to be inhaled.
Ventilation. Ventilation is another key factor in the risk for
airborne transmission of disease. Airborne infectious particles
disburse throughout an entire enclosed space; thus, if air is
allowed to circulate from the room occupied by an infectious
patient into other rooms or central corridors, their occupants
also will be exposed. Areas that have 1) confined air systems
with little or no ventilation or 2) recirculated air without HEPA
filtration have been associated with increased TB transmission.
Duration of exposure. Although transmission of TB has
occurred after brief exposure, the likelihood of infection after
exposure to an infectious patient is associated with the fre-
quency and duration of exposure. However, defining what
constitutes a substantial duration of exposure for any given
contact is difficult. When conducting a contact investigation,
priority should be given first to inmates and employees who
were most exposed to the source patient (21,154,162).
Decision to Initiate a Contact
Investigation
The decision to initiate a contact investigation for an inmate or
detainee with possible TB is made on a case-by-case basis. Each
potential source patient’s clinical presentation and opportunities
for exposure should be evaluated. Contact investigations should
be conducted in the following circumstances:
• Suspected or confirmed pulmonary, laryngeal, or pleu-
ral TB with cavitary disease on chest radiograph or
positive AFB smears (sputum or other respiratory
specimens). If the sputum smear is positive and the NAA
is negative, TB is unlikely, and a contact investigation typi-
cally can be deferred. A negative NAA on an AFB-smear-
negative specimen, however, should not influence
decisions about the contact investigation (102).
• Suspected or confirmed pulmonary (noncavitary) or
pleural TB with negative AFB smears (sputum or other
respiratory specimens) and a decision has been made
to initiate TB treatment. A more limited initial investi-
gation may be conducted for smear-negative cases.
Contact investigations typically are not indicated for
extrapulmonary TB cases (except for laryngeal and pleural TB),
unless pulmonary involvement is also diagnosed.
The decision as to whether the facility should conduct a
contact investigation should be guided by the probability that
an inmate or employee has pulmonary TB. Sputum results
for AFB serve as a major determinant (165). However, in cer-
tain patients with pulmonary TB, collecting sputum samples
is not feasible. In this circumstance, other types of respiratory
specimens (e.g., those from bronchoscopy) may be collected
for AFB smear and mycobacterial culture.
Principles for Conducting the Contact
Investigation
No simple formula has been devised for deciding which
contacts to screen in a correctional facility contact investiga-
tion. However, the investigation should be guided by the fol-
lowing basic principles:
• Identified contacts should be stratified by their duration
and intensity of exposure to the source patient.
• HIV-infected contacts should be classified as the highest
priority group for screening and initiation of LTBI therapy,
regardless of duration and intensity of exposure.
• Identified groups of contacts with the greatest degree of
exposure should be screened immediately, followed by
repeat testing at 8–10 weeks if the initial TST or QFT-G is
negative.
• The infection rate should be calculated to assess the level
of TB transmission.
• Decisions to expand the contact investigation to groups
with less exposure should be made on the basis of the
calculated infection rate. If no evidence of transmission is
observed, the investigation should not be expanded. If
transmission is occurring, the investigation should be
expanded incrementally to groups with less exposure.
When the group screened shows minimal or no evidence
of transmission, the contact investigation should not be
expanded further.
• Corrections and medical staff should be included in the
contact investigation depending on their exposure risks.
Ideally, decisions about structuring the contact investiga-
tion should be made collaboratively with the contact investi-
gation team that includes input from the state or local health
department. For certain investigations, screening a convenience
sample before expanding the investigation is prudent. For
example, in jail investigations, multiple contacts might already
have been released, rendering those who remain incarcerated
the only available group for screening. If a substantial num-
ber of high priority contacts cannot be evaluated fully, a wider
contact investigation should be considered.
The investigation should focus on identifying the contacts
at highest risk for transmission, screening them completely,
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and providing a full course of LTBI treatment for persons
demonstrated to be infected. In general, because wide-scale
investigations divert attention away from the high priority
activities necessary to interrupt transmission in the facility,
mass screening of all persons who had any contact with the
source patient should be avoided (166). Rarely is a person so
infectious that wide-scale expansion of the contact investiga-
tion is necessary or beneficial.
Medical Evaluation of Contacts
Appropriate medical evaluation depends on both the immu-
nologic status (e.g., HIV infection) of the contact and previous
TST or QFT-G results. Adequate knowledge of these data is
possible only through use of a medical record system that is
complete, up-to-date, and reliable with regard to TST or
QFT-G status, testing date, and documentation of the reading
in millimeters (for TST). Without an adequate medical record
system (and therefore definitive information regarding prior TST
or QFT-G results), the true infection and transmission rates
cannot be determined. The lack of such information is likely to
lead to unnecessary expansion of the contact investigation.
All Contacts
All contacts should be interviewed for symptoms of TB dis-
ease using a standard symptom questionnaire. Symptomatic
contacts should receive a chest radiograph and a complete
medical evaluation by a physician, regardless of TST or
QFT-G status; they also should be isolated appropriately (i.e.,
inmates should be placed in an AII room if infectious TB is
suspected by chest radiograph or clinical findings; staff should
not be permitted to work).†† HIV testing should be consid-
ered for all contacts whose HIV status is unknown.
Inmates with Documented Previous Positive
TST or QFT-G results
Inmates who are asymptomatic, HIV-negative, and have
previous positive TST or QFT-G results need no further
follow-up, other than consideration for “routine” treatment
of LTBI, if not completed in the past. However, if such an
inmate has any signs or symptoms suggestive of TB, further
evaluation should be conducted (e.g., a chest radiograph for
persons with respiratory symptoms).
HIV-Infected Inmates
HIV-infected contacts should be interviewed for symptoms,
have a TST or QFT-G and chest radiograph performed, and
initiate a complete course of treatment for LTBI (once TB
disease has been ruled out), regardless of the TST or QFT-G
result. Treatment should be initiated even for persons with a
history of previous treatment for LTBI or TB disease because
of the possibility of re-infection. Those with a history of a
negative TST or QFT-G should have a TST or QFT-G placed
at baseline and again in 8–10 weeks. The results of the TST or
QFT-G will not affect treatment decisions, but they will pro-
vide important information for the contact investigation.
Anergy testing is not recommended (52).
Previous TST-Negative or QFT-G–Negative
Inmates (HIV Negative)
Mandatory tuberculin skin or QFT-G testing of all previ-
ously TST- or QFT-G–negative inmate contacts should be
conducted at baseline (unless previously tested within 1–3
months of exposure). Testing should be repeated 8–10 weeks
from the most recent contact with the source patient (58,167).
TST and QFT-G Converters
Persons whose TSTs or QFT-Gs convert or those with newly
documented, positive TST or QFT-G results should be
offered treatment for LTBI unless medically contraindicated.
If inmate contacts refuse medically indicated treatment for
LTBI, they should be monitored regularly for symptoms. Cer-
tain facilities have chosen to monitor HIV-infected contacts
with follow-up chest radiographs.
Contact Investigation Stepwise
Procedures
The following steps are involved in conducting a contact
investigation and might overlap in time. As soon as a person
is confirmed or suspected of having TB disease, the case should
be reported to the appropriate local health authorities and
contacts promptly evaluated.
• Notify correctional management officials. Identifica-
tion of TB in an inmate or facility staff member can be
alarming for other inmates, corrections staff, and the com-
munity. The administrator should be notified through ap-
propriate chain of command that a case of TB has been
identified in the institution so that appropriate briefing
and educational efforts can be initiated.
• Conduct a source patient chart review. The following
data (with specific dates) should be collected: 1) history
of previous exposure to TB, 2) history of TB symptoms
(e.g., cough, fever, and night sweats), 3) weight history
(particularly unexplained weight loss), 4) chest radiograph
reports, 5) previous TST or QFT-G results, 6) myco-
bacteriology results (e.g., AFB smears, cultures, and sus-
ceptibilities), 7) NAA test results, 8) HIV status, and
9) other medical risk factors.†† Asymptomatic contacts with normal chest radiographs typically do not
require isolation.
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• Interview the source patient. A chart review and case
interview should be accomplished within 1 working day
for persons with AFB smear-positive respiratory specimens
or cavitation on chest radiograph and within 3 days for
all other persons (165). Source patients should be asked
concerning TB symptom history, with a particular focus
on duration of cough. Source patients also should be asked
about where they conduct their daily activities. Persons
with confirmed or suspected TB who were detained dur-
ing the course of the infectious period should be inter-
viewed regarding potential community contacts,
particularly HIV-infected persons and young children;
information regarding the location of community con-
tacts also should be obtained. Source patients should be
questioned regarding contacts during a second interview
conducted 7–14 days after the first.
• Define the infectious period. Defining the infectious
period for a source patient helps investigators determine
how far back to go when investigating potential contacts.
The infectious period is typically defined as 12 weeks
before TB diagnosis or onset of cough (whichever is
longer). If a patient has no TB symptoms, is AFB smear
negative, and has a noncavitary chest radiograph, the pre-
sumed infectious period can be reduced to 4 weeks before
the date of first positive finding consistent with TB. If the
contact investigation reveals that TB transmission occurred
throughout the identified infectious period, the period
for contact investigation might need to be expanded
beyond 12 weeks.
• Convene the contact investigation team. After TB is
diagnosed, a team of professionals (e.g., infection-control,
medical, nursing, custody, and local public health person-
nel) should be convened and charged with planning the
contact investigation. A team leader should be identified
and the roles and responsibilities of each team member
defined, and a schedule of regular meetings (documented
formally with written minutes) should be established. In
addition, a communications plan and a plan for handling
contact investigation data should be developed.
• Update correctional management officials. Adminis-
trative personnel should be kept apprised of the strategy,
process, and action steps involved in conducting the con-
tact investigation.
• Obtain source case inmate traffic history. The dates
and locations of the source patient’s housing during the
infectious period and information regarding employment
and education should be obtained. Groups of contacts
should be prioritized according to duration of exposure
and immune status.
• Tour exposure sites. A tour should be conducted of each
place the source patient lived, worked, or went to school
during the infectious period. In addition, information
should be obtained regarding any correctional facility that
has housed the source patient during the infectious period,
including 1) the number of inmates who are housed to-
gether at one time, 2) the housing arrangement (e.g., cells
versus dorms), 3) the general size of the air space, 4) the
basics of the ventilation system (e.g., whether air is recir-
culated), 5) the pattern of daily inmate movement (e.g.,
when eating, working, and recreating), and 6) the avail-
ability of data on other inmates housed at the same time
as the source patient. The assistance of a facility engineer
often is necessary to help characterize the ventilation sys-
tem and airflow direction within a correctional facility.
• Prioritize contacts. Contacts should be grouped accord-
ing to duration and intensity of exposure. Persons with
the most exposure and HIV-infected or other immuno-
suppressed contacts (regardless of duration of exposure)
are considered highest priority. Because progression from
exposure to death can be rapid among HIV-infected per-
sons in a facility in which HIV-infected persons are housed
or congregated separately, the entire group should be given
high priority (45).
• Develop contact lists. Rosters of inmate and employee
contacts from each location should be obtained and their
current location investigated. Lists of exposed contacts
should be generated and grouped according to current
location (e.g., still incarcerated, released, and transferred).
• Conduct a medical record review on each high-
priority contact. TST or QFT-G status, chest radiograph
history, history of treatment for LTBI, HIV status, and
other high-risk medical conditions should be recorded.
Particular attention should be given to weight history and
previous visits to facility health-care professionals for res-
piratory symptoms. Dates should be carefully recorded.
• Evaluate HIV-infected contacts for TB disease and
LTBI promptly. LTBI therapy should be initiated
promptly among these persons once TB disease has been
excluded.
• Place and read initial TSTs or perform QFT-Gs on eli-
gible contacts. Tuberculin skin or QFT-G testing of all
previously TST- or QFT-G–negative inmate contacts
should be conducted at baseline (unless previously tested
within 1–3 months of exposure). Referrals should be made
for persons who have been released or transferred before
receiving their initial TST or QFT-G.
• Make referrals for contact evaluation. Referrals should
be made to the local health department for inmate con-
tacts of the source case who have been released or trans-
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ferred to another facility. Additionally, family members
or frequent visitors of the source patient should be inves-
tigated by the health department; follow-up TST or
QFT-G results for a substantial percentage of contacts of
released inmates have been obtained on re-arrest by match-
ing the list of exposed contacts with the jail intake TST
or QFT-G registry (21).
• Calculate the infection rate and determine the need to
expand the investigation. To calculate the infection rate,
the total number of inmates whose TST or QFT-G has
converted from negative to positive should be divided by
the total number with a TST placed and read or QFT-G
performed. Persons with a history of a prior positive TST
or QFT-G should be excluded. The infection rate should
be calculated by exposure site. In addition, if using tuber-
culin skin testing, separately calculating the rate for U.S.-
versus foreign-born inmates might provide useful data
(33); foreign-born contacts often have a history of BCG
vaccination, and a TST “conversion” among these con-
tacts might represent a vaccination-associated “booster”
TST response (168). The contact investigation team
should analyze the infection rate(s) and decide whether
to expand the investigation.
• Place and read follow-up TSTs or perform follow-up
QFT-Gs. Follow-up TSTs or QFT-Gs for contacts who
had a negative TST or QFT-G result on initial testing
should be placed 8–10 weeks after exposure to the source
patient has ended. Referrals should be made for persons
who have been released or transferred and need a follow-
up TST or QFT-G.
• Determine the infection/transmission rate. The infec-
tion rate from the second round of testing should be cal-
culated. In addition, the need to expand the investigation
should be determined.
• Write a summary report. The summary report should
briefly describe the circumstances of the investigation, how
it was conducted, the results of the investigation (e.g., the
number of secondary cases identified and the infection
and transmission rates), and any special interventions
required (including follow-up plans). The report should
be distributed to corrections administrators and the local
health department.
Tuberculosis Training
and Education of Correctional
Workers and Inmates
TB training and education of correctional workers and other
persons associated with any correctional facility (e.g., volun-
teers and inmates) can help lower the risk for TB transmission
and disease. To ensure the effectiveness of such training and
education, multiple factors should be considered. First, correc-
tional facilities and local or state health departments should
collaborate when providing TB training and education to cor-
rectional workers; specifically, facilities should routinely work
with health department staff to provide them with corrections-
specific training. Second, routine TB education should be pro-
vided for all persons who spend significant time in the facility,
and additional training should be given to any employee who
will interact with persons at risk for TB. The ideal amount of
training time and information varies by the local risk for TB
transmission and by the job descriptions and characteristics of
those needing training. Finally, TB training and education
efforts and other TB-related events should be documented to
ensure that these programs can be evaluated and updated.
Training and Education in Correctional
Facilities
Correctional workers, volunteers, inmates, and other per-
sons spending significant time in correctional facilities should
receive training and education regarding M. tuberculosis as part
of in-facility, preservice training or orientation. Training should
be provided at least annually thereafter.
In-facility training and education efforts can build on exist-
ing sources of TB-related preservice education and training.
Regional and national professional associations frequently
provide ongoing education regarding TB and infection con-
trol, and national correctional health-care conferences and
courses for medical professionals working in correctional
facilities regularly include TB in their curricula.
TB-associated training should be designed to meet the needs
of correctional workers with diverse job descriptions. In mul-
tiple facilities and for multiple categories of correctional work-
ers, appropriate TB training might be accomplished through
incorporation of the topic into other annual employee trainings
(e.g., bloodborne pathogen training); more extensive or topic-
specific training should be developed for persons who are spe-
cifically involved in TB control. Facilities that use inmates to
provide peer-to-peer TB-education programs should provide
similarly tailored training to any participating inmates.
Facilities located in areas with a high TB prevalence or whose
inmates have lived in such areas might need to increase the
time and resources dedicated to TB training.
The correctional facility health services director or designee
(i.e., the staff member responsible for a facility’s TB control
program) should collaborate with the local public health
department to establish TB education and training activities.
In addition, these staff members routinely should evaluate and
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update the facility’s TB training and education program in
collaboration with the public health sector. External changes
in the prevalence of TB in the community, changes in state or
local public health policies, or changes in national TB control
guidelines might necessitate the conduct of regular educational
updates for staff.
Each facility should maintain training records to monitor
correctional worker training and education. Records of
TB-related adverse events (e.g., documented in-facility trans-
mission) also should be monitored as a means of evaluating
training and education outcomes. The circumstances of
adverse events should be investigated, and the possibility of
enhanced or altered training should be considered as an
appropriate intervention.
Initial Training and Education
for all Correctional Workers
Although the level and detail of any employee’s initial TB
training and education session will vary according to staff mem-
bers’ job responsibilities, the following components should be
included for all correctional workers, regardless of job function:
• communication regarding the basic concepts of M.
tuberculosis transmission, signs, symptoms, diagnosis
(including the difference between LTBI and TB disease),
and prevention;
• provision of basic information regarding the importance
of following up on inmates or correctional workers dem-
onstrating signs or symptoms of TB disease;
• need for initiation of airborne precautions of inmates with
suspected or confirmed TB disease;
• review of the policies and indications for discontinuing
AII precautions;
• discussion of basic principles of treatment for TB disease
and LTBI; and
• discussion regarding TB disease in immunocompromised
persons.§§
Required Training for Correctional
Workers in Facilities with AII Rooms
Correctional workers in facilities equipped with AII rooms
also should be provided clear guidelines regarding the identi-
fication and containment of persons with TB disease. Educa-
tion efforts for these staff members should include 1) discus-
sion of the use of administrative and engineering controls and
personal protective equipment and 2) a respiratory protec-
tion program (including annual training) as mandated by
OSHA (Standard 29 CFR OSHA/DOL [87]).
Enhanced Training and Education
for Correctional Workers in
High-Risk Facilities
Correctional workers in facilities with a high risk for TB
transmission should receive enhanced and more frequent train-
ing and education concerning
• the signs and symptoms of TB disease,
• transmission of TB disease, and
• TB infection-control policies (including instruction on
and location of the facility’s written infection-control poli-
cies and procedures, exposure control plan, and respira-
tory protection program).
If a contact investigation is being conducted because of sus-
pected or confirmed infectious TB, the health department or
designated health provider should educate facility correctional
workers in all aspects of the investigation. Education should
include information concerning
• contact investigation guidelines (165),
• TB transmission,
• the method used to determine a contact’s risk for infec-
tion and prioritization for evaluation and treatment,
• the noninfectiousness of inmates and correctional work-
ers with LTBI,
• the noninfectiousness of persons with TB disease who have
responded to therapy and have submitted three AFB nega-
tive sputum-smear results, and
• patient confidentiality issues.
Facility staff members who are responsible for TB-control
activities should stay informed regarding current TB trends
and treatment options. Conference attendance, participation
in professional programs, and other off-site training are effec-
tive supplemental training strategies for correctional worker
trainers and facility medical and infection-control staff.
Training and Education of Public
Health Department Staff
State and local health department staff providing consulta-
tion or direct services to a correctional facility (including those
who act as liaisons) should receive training and education
regarding the unique aspects of health care and TB control in
the correctional facility setting. Correctional facility adminis-
trators, contracted correctional facility health-care profession-
§§ Because being immunocompromised (having pathologic or iatrogenic
immune suppression, e.g., HIV infection or chemotherapy) is a risk factor
for TB disease, correctional workers should be educated on the relation
between TB and medical conditions associated with being immuno-
compromised. Correctional workers should be encouraged to discuss known
or possible immunocompromising conditions with their private physicians
or health-care professionals.
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als, and health department staff should collaborate to develop
an appropriate training program. The use of self-study and
other educational materials should be encouraged as a supple-
ment to training. Certain TB training resources also can be
accessed on the Internet (Appendix A). Education and train-
ing of health department staff should cover (but not be lim-
ited to) the following topics:
• TB-related roles of correctional facility and health depart-
ment staff;
• methods of effectively collaborating with correctional
facilities;
• differences between and among jails, prisons, and other
forms of detention facilities;
• correctional culture and the importance of respecting the
mission and purpose (i.e., custody) of correctional facili-
ties and correctional workers;
• the health department’s role in the discharge of inmates
(see Discharge Planning); and
• the effect of the custody and movement of foreign
detainees on local facilities.
Training and Education of Inmates
Inmates should receive education from facility health-care
professionals or other appropriately trained workers manag-
ing the screening or treatment process. Education and train-
ing should be appropriate in terms of the education level and
language of the trainees. The following components should
be incorporated into inmate training and education programs:
• general TB information (provided either at the time of
admission or when being screened for TB);
• the meaning of a positive TST or QFT-G result and treat-
ment options for LTBI;
• comprehensive TB education, including the infectious-
ness of and treatment for inmates being confined with
suspected or confirmed TB disease; and
• the importance of completing treatment for inmates with
LTBI or TB disease.
Program Evaluation
Six steps should be followed to ensure successful monitor-
ing and evaluation of a TB-prevention and -control program:
• identifying collaborators,
• describing the TB-control program,
• focusing the evaluation to assess TB risk and performance,
• collecting and organizing data,
• analyzing data and forming conclusions, and
• using the information to improve the TB program (169).
The purpose of program evaluation is to improve account-
ability, enable ongoing learning and problem-solving, and
identify opportunities for improvement. The evaluation pro-
cess should be designed to provide information relevant to
the stakeholders. Measures should be simple and the commu-
nication of results meaningful.
Identifying Collaborators
TB control requires the collaboration of correctional sys-
tems, health departments, and other community agencies;
effective program evaluation also involves teamwork. Early
engagement of program staff and internal and external col-
laborators (including custody staff ) helps ensure that the evalu-
ation will yield the information that is most useful to
stakeholders. Such engagement also promotes mutual coop-
eration for constructive change. Although multiple parties
might be involved, each TB program should have a single
person designated to be responsible for data quality and pro-
gram evaluation. Designating staff for these activities helps
ensure that continuity and accountability are maintained.
Describing the Program
Underlying a useful evaluation is an understanding of how
the TB program currently operates within the context of the
facility. Evaluators should be knowledgeable about program
goals and objectives, strategies, expected program-associated
results, and the way in which the program fits into the larger
organization and community. This information can typically
be obtained by reviewing a facility’s existing TB-control plan.
In addition, all stakeholders should agree on program goals
before the evaluation is undertaken (169).
Focusing the Evaluation to Assess TB
Risk and Performance
Risk Assessment
Each facility should assess its level of TB risk at least annu-
ally (71). The TB risk assessment (see Screening) determines
the types and levels of administrative and environmental con-
trols needed. Assessment of a facility’s risk level includes analysis
of disease burden and facility transmission, which can be con-
ducted by examining the following indicators:
• Burden of disease
— community rates of TB disease (including other com-
munities from which substantial numbers of inmates
come; these data are available from local health
departments),
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— the number of cases of TB disease in the facility dur-
ing the preceding year, and
— the number and percentage of inmates and staff with
LTBI; and
• Facility transmission
— the number and percentage of staff and inmates whose
tests for TB infection converted and the reasons for
the conversion,
— the number of TB exposure incidents (see Contact
Investigation), and
— evidence of person-to-person transmission.
Conversion rates (as determined by annual testing) for staff
and inmates should be determined and tracked over time to
monitor for unsuspected transmission in the facility. In larger
facilities, conversion rates for staff assigned to areas that might
place them at higher risk for TB (e.g., booking and holding
areas, day rooms, libraries, enclosed recreation areas, medical
and dental areas, and transport vehicles) should be calculated
and tracked. Staff should analyze contributing factors to TB
exposure and transmission and plan for corrective interven-
tion, as appropriate. The following performance measures
should be considered when determining risk within all cor-
rectional facilities, including those that function as a contract
facility within a larger correctional system:
• the timeliness with which patients with suspected TB dis-
ease are detected, isolated, and evaluated (see Performance
Measurement for Improving Quality); and
• other factors (e.g., the total number of patients with TB
housed in the facility and the number of persons housed
in the facility who are risk for TB) that will help deter-
mine the controls needed (71).
Performance Measurement for Improving
Quality
The risk-assessment process enables the monitoring of risk
for TB transmission (the key program indicator) and helps
guide the focus and intensity of ongoing performance mea-
surement and monitoring. Facilities at higher risk (e.g., those
with cases of TB disease) benefit more from broader investi-
gation of performance than facilities at lower risk. Risk-
assessment findings should help guide the development of
simple process performance measures for each pertinent area
of TB prevention and control. These performance measures
can then be used to monitor program implementation and
intermediate outcomes. Treatment completion and continu-
ity of care are key performance indicators. Each facility should
have goals against which to measure performance in these
areas (e.g., 100% of patients with TB disease will have docu-
mented treatment completion or, in the case of release or trans-
fer, continuity of treatment on release). For LTBI, goals might
be that 100% of patients released during treatment will have
a documented referral for continuity of care in the commu-
nity and that 90% of these patients will follow-up on their
referral. The following are examples of possible performance
measures that can be useful as part of a TB program evalua-
tion, depending on the level of risk:
• Timeliness of screening and isolation
— time from inmate admission to testing for TB infection,
— time from TB testing to obtaining test results,
— time from positive TB infection test results to obtain-
ing a chest radiograph,
— time from identification of a suspect TB patient
(either through symptoms or abnormal chest radio-
graph) to placement in an AII room,
— time from sputum collection to receipt of results, and
— time from suspicious result (either via radiograph,
smear-positive result, or smear-negative/culture-
positive result) to initiation of contact investigation;
• Treatment
— the number and percentage of patients with LTBI who
initiated treatment and the percentage of persons who
completed the prescribed treatment for LTBI (excluding
those released from or transferred out of the facility),
— the number and percentage of persons in whom TB
disease was diagnosed who completed the prescribed
treatment regimen (excluding those released from or
transferred out of the facility), and
— the reasons for treatment interruption among persons
who stop therapy; and
• Continuity of care¶¶
— the number and percentage of patients released before
completing treatment for TB disease or LTBI who had
documented community appointments (or referrals)
for continuity of care, and
— the number and percentage of patients with confirmed
and suspected TB disease who kept their first medical
appointment in the community.
Other pertinent performance measures for correctional
facilities might include the adherence rates among inmates
and staff who should undergo TB testing, the percentage of
staff receiving TB education and training annually, and the
percentage of inmates receiving TB education.
Assessment of Collaboration
On an annual basis, each program also should evaluate its
success in working collaboratively with local and state public
health departments in each area of TB control (e.g., screen-
¶¶ Public health departments typically track treatment completion rates for
patients referred to their care.
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ing, containment, and assessment). Correctional systems
should meet with their respective public health departments
each year to assess risk, update TB policies and procedures,
and assess compliance regarding environmental control and
respiratory protection recommendations (see Environmental
Controls and Respiratory Protection). Correctional systems
also should assess collaboration with other agencies to which
the inmates are released.
Collecting and Organizing Data
Data Sources
As part of quality assessment, all facilities that house per-
sons with confirmed or suspected TB disease should conduct
periodic reviews of medical records for these patients and for
a sample of patients with LTBI. In collaboration with the
public health department, the review should be conducted at
least annually in facilities with any confirmed or suspected
cases of TB (including low-risk facilities) and quarterly in
higher-risk facilities with numerous cases. The record review
should compare actual performance against time standards,
protocols, and goals for TB activities and outcomes (see Per-
formance Measures for Improving Quality). Multiple tools
are available for data collection (Appendix B) (131).
Medical records should contain information regarding TB
history and risk factors, treatment, and all other interventions
and dates to enable performance to be monitored. Other
sources of data include log books, interviews with staff, and
observations. Quality controls for TST placement and read-
ing should be checked at least annually. The quality of the
data used for calculating performance also should be verified.
Information Infrastructure
Effective program monitoring and evaluation is made pos-
sible through the reliable collection of valid data and through
analysis of these data. Health-care professionals responsible
for the prevention and control of TB within a correctional
facility should have access to complete medical records and a
database of essential TB-related activity and measurements.
A retrievable aggregate record system is essential for tracking
all inmates and for assessing the status of persons who have
TB disease and LTBI, particularly in large jail and prison sys-
tems in which inmates are transferred frequently from one
facility or unit to another. This record system should main-
tain at minimum current information about the location,
screening results, treatment status, and degree of infectious-
ness of these persons. In addition to facilitating case manage-
ment, such a record system provides facilities with the
information necessary for conducting annual TB risk assess-
ments, monitoring TB trends, measuring performance, and
assessing the effectiveness of overall TB control efforts. Infor-
mation contained in health records should always be kept
confidential; all staff members involved in program evalua-
tion should receive training to maintain the confidentiality of
patient information.
Although medical databases can be maintained manually,
electronic databases provide additional benefits by enabling a
facility to 1) better track inmates for testing and case manage-
ment, 2) access information regarding tests for TB infection,
3) share medical information regarding transferred inmates
with other facilities, 4) link with the local health department,
and 5) measure the effectiveness of TB-control efforts.
Analyzing Data and Drawing
Conclusions
In a multifacility correctional system, evaluation data should
be compiled for each facility separately and in aggregate. Data
should be analyzed against standards, which can be defined
externally (e.g., by national organizations or CDC-defined
standards) or internally as established by the program collabo-
rators (170). Once analyzed, conclusions should be drawn
from the data and recommendations for program improve-
ment developed. The evaluation and recommendations should
be shared with program staff, administrators, and partners,
including the local public health department.
Using Information to Improve
the TB Program
The final step in the evaluation process is to implement the
recommendations to improve the TB program. Program staff
should use data to identify and remove barriers to improving
performance, and administrators should make necessary revi-
sions to policies or procedures.
Because the evaluation process is cyclical, assessing whether
recommendations have been implemented and whether out-
comes are improved is crucial. Existing data can be used to
clearly demonstrate the effects of implemented interventions.
Collaboration and Responsibilities
The management of TB from the time an inmate is sus-
pected of having the disease until treatment is complete pre-
sents multiple opportunities for collaboration between
correctional facilities and the public health department. For
example, public health agencies can partner with correctional
facilities in TB screening and treatment activities. In a study
of 20 urban jail systems and their respective public health
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departments, only 35% reported having collaborated effec-
tively when conducting TB-prevention and -control activities
(38). Formal organizational mechanisms (e.g., designated
liaisons, regular meetings, health department TB program staff
providing on-site services, and written agreements) are associ-
ated with more effective collaboration between correctional
facilities and health departments (37).
Correctional facilities and health departments should each
designate liaisons for TB-associated efforts. Liaisons should
serve as a familiar and accessible communication link between
collaborating entities. The duty of liaison at the correctional
facility should be assigned to the person responsible for TB
control or to another staff member familiar with TB control
and patient management at the facility. Regular meetings
between correctional facilities and health departments are
important to establish communication and collaboration on
TB-related issues (37,171). Jurisdictions with regularly sched-
uled meetings between jails and public health staff are 13 times
more likely to report having highly effective collaboration than
jurisdictions that have not established such meetings (37). For
example, in Florida, the state TB-control program and cor-
rections health officials hold quarterly coordination meetings
on TB issues and regularly scheduled collaborative TB case-
review conferences (171), activities that have encouraged com-
munication between facilities and local health departments.
The presence of health department staff in correctional
facilities can help promote more effective collaboration
(37,171). Functions provided by such personnel within the
correctional facility setting include screening, surveillance,
education and training, contact investigation, and follow-up
after release (171). For example, New York City Department
of Health and Mental Hygiene personnel assigned to the Rikers
Island jail interview inmates, monitor their care, suggest
interventions or changes, and work with the jail to determine
discharge planning needs for continuity of care in the com-
munity. Data access links are available on site that enable health
department personnel to promptly inform corrections staff
regarding previous completed therapy, incomplete work-up
or therapy, sputum-smear results, culture and drug-
susceptibility data, and ongoing treatment for TB cases and
suspects. These on-site access links diminish the time spent in
AII rooms and decrease the time required for patient work-up
by providing confirmatory historical documentation.
Correctional facilities and health departments should work
together to agree on and delineate their respective roles and
responsibilities. Establishing clear roles and responsibilities
helps avoid duplication, confusion, the potential for breach-
ing patient confidentiality, excess expenditures, and missed
opportunities.
Roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined for all
TB-control activities that might require collaboration between
correctional facilities and health departments, including
• screening and treatment of inmates for LTBI and TB disease,
• reporting of TB disease,
• follow-up of inmates with symptoms or abnormal chest
radiographs,
• medical consultation regarding persons with confirmed
and suspected TB disease,
• contact investigations for reported TB cases,
• continuity of treatment and discharge planning for per-
sons with TB disease and LTBI,
• training and education of correctional facility staff,
• evaluation of screening and case management, and
• facility risk assessment.
Agreements about roles and responsibilities may be formal
or informal, but they should be recorded in writing. Formal
agreements include memoranda of understanding and writ-
ten policies or plans. Informal agreements may be as simple as
an e-mail summary of a verbal discussion or meeting. The
format for recording and communicating agreements (e.g.,
checklists, flow charts, algorithms, and lists of steps) may vary
depending on the need. Once agreements are made, they
should be reassessed periodically (see Program Evaluation).
Correctional facilities and health departments should work
together to formulate agreements that specify the informa-
tion to be shared in a particular time frame, who will have
access to specific information or databases, and how patient
confidentiality will be protected. Information systems pro-
vide the framework for recording and accessing pertinent
information (see Program Evaluation). Health departments
should provide correctional facilities with pertinent TB sur-
veillance information (e.g., local rates of drug resistance, the
number of TB cases occurring in correctional facilities rela-
tive to the community, and the number of TB cases identified
in the community among recently incarcerated persons), which
can bolster support for TB-screening activities within these
facilities.
Legislation or policy statements can effectively encourage
or mandate collaboration on issues (e.g., disease reporting,
contact investigation, and discharge planning) when institu-
tional barriers (e.g., time and resources) inhibit collaboration.
For example, California has improved discharge planning by
prohibiting the release or transfer of inmates with confirmed
or suspected TB unless a written treatment plan has been re-
ceived and accepted by the local health officer (172). Arizona’s
state administrative code places responsibility for contact in-
vestigations of TB exposures in correctional facilities on the
correctional facility but requires consultation with (and re-
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porting to) the local health department. ICE also has devel-
oped a policy memorandum requesting that ICE field office
directors grant a short-term hold on the deportation of pa-
tients with TB disease to allow time for the ICE health ser-
vices program to facilitate continuity of care.
Summary of Recommendations
Screening
Early identification and successful treatment of persons with
TB disease remains the most effective means of preventing
disease transmission. Inmates who are likely to have infec-
tious TB should be identified and begin treatment before they
are released into the general population. Screening programs
in the correctional setting also allow for the detection of sub-
stantial numbers of persons with LTBI who are at high risk
for TB disease and would likely benefit from a course of treat-
ment.
The type of screening recommended for a particular cor-
rectional facility is determined by an assessment of the risk for
TB transmission within that facility. The risk assessment should
be performed annually and should be conducted in collabo-
ration with the local or state health department. A facility’s
TB risk level can be defined as minimal or nonminimal.
A facility should be classified as having minimal TB risk on
the basis of four criteria:
• No cases of infectious TB have occurred in the facility in
the last year.
• The facility does not house substantial numbers of
inmates with risk factors for TB (e.g., HIV infection and
injection-drug use).
• The facility does not house substantial numbers of new
immigrants (i.e., persons arriving in the United States
within the previous 5 years) from areas of the world with
high rates of TB.
• Employees of the facility are not otherwise at risk for TB.
Any facility that does not meet all of these criteria should be
categorized as being a nonminimal TB risk facility.
Inmates in all minimal TB risk correctional and detention
facilities require an evaluation at entry for symptoms of TB.
Persons with symptoms of TB require an immediate evalua-
tion to rule out the presence of infectious disease and must be
kept in an AII room until they are evaluated. All newly
arrived inmates should be evaluated for clinical conditions
and other factors that increase the risk for TB disease. Persons
who have any of these conditions require further screening
with a TST, a QFT-G, or a chest radiograph within 7 days of
arrival. Regardless of TST or QFT-G result, inmates known
to have HIV infection or other severe immunosuppression, as
well as inmates who are at risk for HIV infection but whose
HIV status is unknown, should have a chest radiograph taken
as part of the initial screening. Persons who have an abnormal
chest radiograph should be evaluated further to rule out TB
disease; if TB disease is excluded as a diagnosis, LTBI therapy
should be considered if the TST or QFT-G is positive.
In nonminimal TB risk prisons, symptom screening assess-
ment should be performed immediately for all new inmates.
Any inmate who has symptoms suggestive of TB should be
placed in an AII room and evaluated promptly for TB disease.
Inmates who have no symptoms require further screening with
a TST, a QFT-G, or a chest radiograph within 7 days of arrival.
Regardless of their TST or QFT-G status, inmates known to
have HIV infection or other severe immunosuppression, and
inmates who are at risk for HIV infection but whose HIV
status is unknown, should have a chest radiograph taken as
part of the initial screening. Persons who have an abnormal
chest radiograph should be evaluated further to rule out TB
disease; if TB disease is excluded as a diagnosis, LTBI therapy
should be considered if the TST or QFT-G result is positive.
Symptom screening should be performed immediately on
entry for all new detainees in nonminimal TB risk jails. Any
detainee who has symptoms suggestive of TB should be placed
in an AII room and promptly evaluated for TB disease.
Detainees who are without symptoms require further screen-
ing with a TST, a QFT-G, or a chest radiograph within 7 days
of arrival. Regardless of TST or QFT-G result, detainees known
to have HIV infection, and detainees who are at risk for HIV
infection but whose HIV status is unknown, should have a
chest radiograph taken as part of the initial screening. Persons
who have a positive result should be further evaluated to rule
out TB disease. Screening in jails with the TST or QFT-G for
purposes of initiating LTBI therapy often is not practical
because of the high rate of turnover and short lengths of stay.
A medical history relating to TB should be obtained from
and recorded for all new employees at the time of hiring, and
a physical examination for TB disease should be required. In
addition, TST or QFT-G screening should be mandatory for
all employees who do not have a documented positive result.
Persons who have a positive TST or QFT-G result should have
a chest radiograph taken and interpreted and should be
required to have a thorough medical evaluation; if TB disease
is excluded as a diagnosis, such persons should be considered
for LTBI therapy. All employees should be informed and
instructed to seek appropriate follow-up and screening for TB
if they are immunosuppressed for any reason (e.g., HIV
infection, organ transplant recipient receiving immunosup-
pressive therapy, and treatment with TNF-α antagonist). Any
employee who has symptoms suggestive of TB should not
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return to the workplace until a clinician has excluded a diag-
nosis of contagious TB disease.
In general, long-term inmates and all employees who have a
negative baseline TST or QFT-G result should have follow-
up testing at least annually. Persons who have a history of a
positive test result should be screened annually for symptoms
of TB disease. Annual chest radiographs are unnecessary for
the follow-up evaluation of infected persons. Test results should
be recorded in medical records and in a retrievable aggregate
database of all TST or QFT-G results.
Case Reporting
Correctional facility medical staff must report any suspected
or confirmed TB cases among inmates or employees to the
appropriate health agency in accordance with state and local
laws and regulations, even if the inmate or detainee has
already been released or transferred from the facility. Reporting
cases to health departments benefits the correctional facility by
allowing it to obtain health department resources for case man-
agement and contact investigation in both the facility and the
community. In addition, drug-susceptibility results should be
used to inform optimal therapy and sent to the state or local
health department for use in monitoring the rates of drug resis-
tance. The drug-susceptibility reports also should be sent to all
health departments managing contacts of the TB case because
the choice of medication for LTBI treatment is based on drug-
susceptibility test results of the source case. Reports to local or
state health departments should identify the agency that has
custodial responsibility for the inmate.
Airborne Infection Isolation
TB airborne precautions should be initiated for any patient
who 1) has signs or symptoms of TB disease or 2) has docu-
mented TB disease and has not completed treatment or not
previously been determined to be non-infectious. For patients
placed in an AII room because of suspected infectious TB
disease of the lungs, airways, or larynx, airborne precautions
can be discontinued when infectious TB disease is considered
unlikely and either 1) another diagnosis is made that explains
the clinical syndrome or 2) the patient has three negative AFB
sputum-smear results. Incarcerated patients in whom the sus-
picion of TB disease remains after the collection of three nega-
tive AFB sputum-smear results should not be released from
an AII room until they are on standard multidrug anti-TB
treatment and are clinically improving. A patient who has drug-
susceptible TB of the lung, airways, or larynx; who is on stan-
dard multidrug anti-TB treatment; and who has had a clinical
and bacteriologic response to therapy is probably no longer
infectious. However, because culture and drug-susceptibility
results typically are not known when the decision to discon-
tinue airborne precautions is made, all patients in whom the
probability of TB disease is high should remain in an AII room
while incarcerated until they have 1) had three consecutive
negative AFB sputum smear results, 2) received standard
multidrug anti-TB treatment, and 3) demonstrated clinical
improvement.
Environmental Controls
Environmental controls should be implemented when the
risk for TB transmission persists despite efforts to screen and
treat infected inmates. Environmental controls are used to
remove, inactivate, or kill M. tuberculosis in areas in which the
organism could be transmitted. Primary environmental con-
trols consist of controlling the source of infection by using
local exhaust ventilation (e.g., hoods, tents, or booths) and
diluting and removing contaminated air using general venti-
lation. Secondary environmental controls consist of control-
ling the airflow to prevent contamination of air in areas
adjacent to the source (AII rooms) and cleaning the air using
HEPA filtration and/or UVGI. The efficiency of different
primary or secondary environmental controls varies. A
detailed discussion concerning the application of environ-
mental controls has been published previously(71).
Personal Respiratory Protection
Respiratory protection is used when administrative (i.e.,
identification and isolation of infectious TB patients) and
environmental controls alone have not reduced the risk for
infection with M. tuberculosis to an acceptable level. The use
of respiratory protection might be most appropriate in spe-
cific settings and situations within correctional facilities; for
example, protection is warranted for inmates and facility staff
when they enter AII rooms, transport infectious inmates in
an enclosed vehicle, and perform or participate in cough-
inducing procedures. In correctional facilities, a CDC/
NIOSH-approved N95 air-purifying respirator will provide
adequate respiratory protection in the majority of situations
that require the use of respirators.
All correctional facility staff members who use respirators
for protection against infection with M. tuberculosis must par-
ticipate in the facility’s respiratory protection program (e.g.,
understand their responsibilities, receive training, receive medi-
cal clearance, and engage in fit testing). All facilities should
develop, implement, and maintain a respiratory-protection
program for health-care workers or other staff who use respi-
ratory protection. (Respiratory-protection programs are re-
quired for facilities covered by OSHA.) In addition to staff
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members, visitors to inmates with TB disease should be given
respirators to wear while in AII rooms and instructed how to
ensure their own respiratory protection by checking their res-
pirator for a proper seal. Each facility, regardless of TB risk
classification (i.e., minimal or nonminimal), should develop
a policy on the use of respirators by visitors of patients.
Diagnosis and Treatment of LTBI
and TB Disease
A diagnosis of TB disease should be considered for any
patient who has a persistent cough (>3 weeks) or other signs
or symptoms compatible with TB disease (e.g., bloody spu-
tum [hemoptysis], night sweats, weight loss, anorexia, and
fever). Diagnostic tests for TB include the TST, QFT-G, chest
radiography, and laboratory examination of sputum samples
or other body tissues and fluids. Persons exposed to inmates
with TB disease might become infected with LTBI, depend-
ing on host immunity and the degree and duration of expo-
sure. Therefore, the treatment of persons with TB disease plays
a key role in TB control by stopping transmission and pre-
venting potentially infectious cases from developing. LTBI is
an asymptomatic condition that can be diagnosed by the TST
or QFT-G.
Regardless of age, correctional facility staff and inmates in
the following high-risk groups should be given treatment for
LTBI if their reaction to the TST is >5 mm:
• HIV-infected persons,
• recent contacts of a TB patient,
• persons with fibrotic changes on chest radiograph consis-
tent with previous TB disease, and
• patients with organ transplants and other immuno-
compromising conditions who receive the equivalent of
>15 mg/day of prednisone for >1 month.
All other correctional facility staff and inmates should be
considered for treatment of LTBI if their TST result is >10
mm induration. The preferred treatment for LTBI is 9 months
of daily isoniazid or biweekly dosing administered by DOT.
Although LTBI treatment regimens are broadly applicable,
modifications should be considered for certain populations
(e.g., patients with HIV infection) and when drug resistance
is suspected.
Individualized case management should be provided for all
patients with TB disease. In addition, patient management
should be coordinated with officials of the local or state health
department. Regimens for treating TB disease must contain
multiple drugs to which the organisms are susceptible. For
the majority of patients, the preferred regimen for treating
TB disease consists of an initial 2-month phase of isoniazid,
rifampin, pyrazinamide, and ethambutol, followed by a con-
tinuation phase of isoniazid and rifampin lasting >4 months,
for a minimum total treatment period of 6 months. The deci-
sion to stop therapy should be based on the number of doses
taken within a maximum period (not simply a 6-month
period). Persons with cavitary pulmonary TB disease and posi-
tive cultures of sputum specimens at the completion of
2 months of therapy should receive a longer, 7-month con-
tinuation phase of therapy (total duration: 9 months) because
of the substantially higher rate of relapse among persons with
this type of TB disease.
Drug-susceptibility testing should be performed on all ini-
tial M. tuberculosis isolates from patients with TB disease. When
results from drug-susceptibility tests become available, the
treatment regimen should be adjusted accordingly. Medical
providers treating patients with drug-resistant TB disease
should seek expert consultation and collaborate with the local
health department for treatment decisions.
TB treatment regimens might need to be altered for HIV-
infected persons who are receiving antiretroviral therapy.
Whenever possible, the care of persons with concomitant TB
and HIV should be provided by or in consultation with
experts in the management of both TB and HIV-related disease.
The primary determinant of treatment outcome is patient
adherence to the drug regimen. Thus, careful attention should
be paid to measures designed to enable and foster adherence.
DOT is the preferred treatment strategy for all persons with
TB disease and high-risk (e.g., HIV infected) persons with
LTBI. DOT should be used throughout the entire course of
therapy whenever feasible. Practitioners providing treatment
to inmates should coordinate DOT with the local health
department on an inmate’s release. The local health depart-
ment also may be involved in monitoring therapy for correc-
tional facility staff.
Discharge Planning
Postrelease follow-up is a necessary component of TB con-
trol efforts. Effective discharge planning requires collabora-
tion between corrections and medical staff (both intra- and
interfacility), as well as with public health and community-
based service organizations.
To ensure uninterrupted treatment, discharge planning for
inmates in whom TB disease is diagnosed must begin as soon
as possible after diagnosis. Corrections or health service
administrators (or their designees) should assign staff to
notify the public health department of inmates receiving treat-
ment for TB disease or LTBI. Inmates with TB disease should
be interviewed while still incarcerated (ideally by public health
staff ) to enable facility administrators to assess and plan for
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the appropriate support and referrals that will be needed after
discharge.
All correctional facilities should assign personnel (preferably
health-care professionals) to serve as case managers. These man-
agers should be responsible for conducting discharge planning
in the facility, which entails coordinating follow-up and com-
municating treatment histories with public health department
and other health-care counterparts within the community.
Contact Investigation
The overall goal of a TB contact investigation is to inter-
rupt transmission of M. tuberculosis. Ongoing transmission is
prevented by 1) identifying, isolating, and treating other per-
sons with TB disease (e.g., secondary patients) and 2) identi-
fying infected contacts of the source and secondary patients
and providing them with a complete course of treatment for
LTBI.
Because decisions involved in planning and prioritizing con-
tact investigations in correctional facilities are seldom simple,
the process benefits from the input of a larger, multi-
disciplinary team when possible. The best preparation for con-
tact investigations in correctional facilities is ongoing, formal
collaboration between correctional and public health officials.
The decision to initiate a contact investigation for an
inmate or detainee with possible TB is made on a case-by-case
basis. In general, contact investigations should be conducted
in the following circumstances: 1) suspected or confirmed
pulmonary, laryngeal, or pleural TB and cavitary disease on
chest radiograph or positive AFB smear results (sputum or
other respiratory specimens) or 2) suspected or confirmed
pulmonary (noncavitary) or pleural TB and negative AFB
smear results (sputum or other respiratory specimens) and a
decision has been made to initiate TB treatment. A more lim-
ited initial investigation may be conducted for smear-
negative cases.
Contact investigation should be conducted in a stepwise
fashion that includes 1) notifying correctional management
officials; 2) conducting a chart review of the source patient;
3) interviewing the source patient; 4) defining the infectious
period; 5) convening the contact investigation team; 6)
updating correctional management officials about the strat-
egy, process, and action steps involved in conducting the con-
tact investigation; 7) obtaining source case inmate traffic
history (i.e., the dates and locations of the TB source patient’s
housing during the infectious period); 8) touring exposure
sites; 9) prioritizing contacts according to duration and
intensity of exposure and risk factors for becoming infected
with TB and progressing to TB disease; 10) developing con-
tact lists; 11) conducting a medical record review on each high-
priority contact; 12) evaluating HIV-infected contacts
promptly; 13) placing and reading initial TSTs or QFT-Gs
on eligible contacts; 14) making referrals for contact evalua-
tion (e.g., referrals to the local health department for contacts
of inmates who have been released or transferred to another
facility, family members, frequent visitors of the source
patient); 15) calculating the infection rate and determining
the need to expand the investigation; 16) placing and reading
follow-up TSTs or QFT-Gs; 17) determining the infection/
transmission rate from the second round of testing; and 18)
writing a summary report.
Training and Education
Although the level and detail of any employee’s initial TB
training and education session will vary according to staff
members’ job responsibilities, the following components
should be included for all correctional workers, regardless of
job function: 1) communication regarding the basic concepts
of M. tuberculosis transmission, signs, symptoms, diagnosis
(including the difference between LTBI and TB disease), and
prevention; 2) provision of basic information regarding the
importance of following up on inmates or correctional work-
ers demonstrating signs or symptoms of TB disease; 3) expla-
nation of the need for initiation of AII of inmates with
suspected or confirmed TB disease; 4) review of the policies
and indications for discontinuing AII precautions; 5) discus-
sion of basic principles of treatment for TB disease and LTBI;
and 6) discussion regarding TB disease in immunocom-
promised persons.
Correctional workers in facilities with a high risk of TB trans-
mission should receive enhanced and more frequent training
and education regarding 1) the signs and symptoms of TB
disease, 2) transmission of TB disease, and 3) infection-con-
trol policies (including instruction on and location of written
infection-control policies and procedures, the facility’s expo-
sure control plan, and the respiratory protection program).
State and local health department staff providing consulta-
tion or direct services to a correctional facility (including those
who act as liaisons) should receive training and education
regarding the unique aspects of health care and TB control in
the correctional facility setting. Correctional facility adminis-
trators, contracted correctional facility health-care profession-
als, and health department staff should collaborate to develop
an appropriate training program. Inmates should receive edu-
cation from facility health-care professionals or other appro-
priately trained workers managing the screening or treatment
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process. Education and training should be appropriate in terms
of the education level and language of the trainees.
Program Evaluation
Program evaluation should be performed based on the CDC
framework. Successful monitoring and evaluation of a
TB-prevention and -control program includes identifying col-
laborators, describing the TB-control program, focusing the
evaluation to assess TB risk and performance, collecting and
organizing data, analyzing data and forming conclusions, and
using the information to improve the TB program.
Collaboration and Responsibilities
The management of TB from the time an inmate is sus-
pected of having the disease until treatment is complete pre-
sents multiple opportunities for collaboration between
correctional facilities and the public health department. For-
mal organizational mechanisms (e.g., designated liaisons, regu-
lar meetings, health department TB-program staff providing
on-site services, and written agreements) have been demon-
strated to be associated with more effective collaboration
between correctional facilities and health departments.
Correctional facilities and health departments should each
designate liaisons for TB-associated efforts. Liaisons should
serve as a familiar and accessible communication link between
collaborating entities. The duty of liaison at the correctional
facility should be assigned to the person responsible for TB
control or to another staff member familiar with TB control
and patient management at the facility.
Correctional facilities and health departments should work
together to agree on and delineate their respective roles and
responsibilities. Establishing clear roles and responsibilities
helps avoid duplication, confusion, the potential for breach-
ing patient confidentiality, excess expenditures, and missed
opportunities. Agreements about roles and responsibilities may
be formal or informal, but they should be recorded in writing
to avoid misunderstandings and to give the agreement lon-
gevity beyond personal relationships.
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Appendix A
Selected Organizations Providing Tuberculosis (TB)
Training And Education Resources
American Thoracic Society http://www.thoracic.org
American Lung Association http://www.lungusa.org
CDC Division of TB Elimination http://www.findtbresources.org,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/pubs/pem.htm
National Commission on Correctional Health Care http://www.ncchc.org
Occupational Safety and Health Administration http://www.osha.gov
State TB control offices http://www.cdc.gov/nchstp/tb/pubs/tboffices.htm
Francis J. Curry National Tuberculosis Center http://www.nationaltbcenter.edu
New Jersey Medical School Global Tuberculosis Institute http://www.umdnj.edu/globaltb/home.htm
Southeastern National Tuberculosis Center http://sntc.medicine.ufl.edu
Heartland National Tuberculosis Center http://www.heartlandntbc.org
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Appendix B
Examples of Data Collection Tools
Person # ____  Page #  ____ 
CHART ABSTRACTION FOR TB INFECTION 
Risk factors from intake/physical                     Circle 
Previous TB disease 
           Prior Rx?   
                   Completed? 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
Previous PPD positive 
            Converted within last 2 years? 
             Prior Rx? 
                    Completed? 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
Known exposure to TB      Y             N            NA 
Known HIV      Y             N            NA 
Known HIV risk (IDU, commercial sex 
worker, HIV-infected partner) 
     Y             N            NA 
Date entered facility ____/____/____ 
    Diagnosed during this incarceration 
    Admitted to facility on treatment for TB infection 
    Admitted to facility after starting, but not completing treatment, for TB infection 
TB symptoms reported?   Y / N / NA 
TST?  Y/ N Date placed / read ___/___/___  Read within 3 days?   Y / N   NA 
QuantiFERON (or other recommended test)   Y/ N  Date drawn ___/___/___ Reported within 2 days? Y / N   NA 
CXR? Y / N  Date CXR read ___/___/___  CXR result  Normal / Abnormal  /  NA 
Treatment for latent infection? Y / N   Date treatment started ___/___/___ 
Completed treatment? Y / N /  In progress / NA   Date completed ___/___/___ 
Release / Transfer Date ___/___/___  NA         Currently incarcerated 
 If released prior to Rx completion: 
  Was community follow-up arranged? Y / N  NA 
  If yes:  referral / appointment / NA 
             To where?   County public health dept. / county hospital/ private provider / 
        drug or ETOH rehab ctr. / other                                
If Rx incomplete and readmitted:
Reincarceration #1:  Admit date ___/___/___   Release date ___/___/___ 
           PPD       CXR       Start treatment       Complete treatment 
Reincarceration #2:  Admit date ___/___/___   Release date ___/___/___ 
           PPD       CXR       Start treatment       Complete treatment 
Reincarceration #3:  Admit date ___/___/___   Release date ___/___/___ 
           PPD       CXR       Start treatment       Complete treatment 
Reincarceration #4:  Admit date ___/___/___   Release date ___/___/___ 
           PPD       CXR       Start treatment       Complete treatment 
Reincarceration #5:  Admit date ___/___/___   Release date ___/___/___ 
           PPD       CXR       Start treatment       Complete treatment 
<DATE>  <FACILITY> 
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Person # ____  Page #  ____ 
CHART ABSTRACTION FOR TB DISEASE  
Risk factors from intake/physical                     Circle 
Previous TB disease 
           Prior Rx?   
                   Completed? 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
Previous PPD positive 
            Converted within last 2 years? 
             Prior Rx? 
                    Completed? 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
     Y             N            NA 
Known exposure to TB      Y             N            NA 
Known HIV      Y             N            NA 
Known HIV risk (IDU, commercial sex 
worker, HIV-infected partner) 
     Y             N            NA 
Date entered facility ____/____/____ 
    Diagnosed during this incarceration 
    Admitted to facility on treatment for TB infection 
    Admitted to facility as a known case, but not on treatment  
TB symptoms reported?   Y / N        Date ___/___/___   
TST?  Y/ N Date placed / read ___/___/___  Read within 3 days?   Y / N   NA 
QuantiFERON (or other recommended test)   Y/ N  Date drawn ___/___/___ Reported within 2 days? Y / N   NA 
CXR? Y / N  Date CXR read ___/___/___  CXR result  Normal / Abnormal 
Isolation? Y / N   Date identified as a suspect  ___/___/___ Date isolated ___/___/___ 
Date released from isolation ___/___/___ 
AFB? Y / N Number AFB specimens collected ________ 
 Date 1st ordered ___/___/___     Dates results reported ___/___/___    AFB Smear + / -   Culture + / - 
___/___/___    AFB Smear + / -   Culture + / - 
       ___/___/___    AFB Smear + / -   Culture + / - 
Treatment? Y / N   Date treatment started ___/___/___   Number of drugs started on: ________ 
Completed treatment? Y / N     NA        Date completed ___/___/___ 
Release / Transfer Date ___/___/___  NA         Currently incarcerated 
 If released prior to Rx completion: 
  Was community follow-up arranged? Y / N  NA 
  If yes:  referral / appointment / NA 
             To where?   County public health dept. / county hospital/ private provider / 
        drug or ETOH rehab ctr. / other                                
  Was a supply of meds provided? Y / N   NA   If yes, for what length of time? ________ 
Was a contact investigation done?  Y / N 
<DATE>  <FACILITY> 
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Acid-fast bacilli (AFB). A laboratory test that involves
microscopic examination of a stained smear (typically of sputum)
to determine if mycobacteria are present. A presumptive
diagnosis of pulmonary tuberculosis (TB) can be made with a
positive AFB sputum smear result; however, approximately
50% of the patients with pulmonary TB disease have negative
AFB sputum-smear results. The diagnosis of TB disease
typically is not confirmed until Mycobacterium tuberculosis is
identified in culture. A positive nucleic acid amplification
(NAA) test is useful as a confirmatory test.
Aerosol. Dispersions of particles in a gaseous medium (e.g.,
air). Droplet nuclei are examples of particles that are expelled
by a person with an infectious disease (e.g., by coughing,
sneezing, or singing). For M. tuberculosis, the droplet nuclei
are approximately 1–5 µm. Because of their small size, the
droplet nuclei can remain suspended in the air for substantial
periods and can transmit M. tuberculosis to other persons.
Adherence. Following instructions regarding a treatment
regimen (adherence to treatment).
Administrative controls. Managerial measures that reduce
the risk for exposure to persons who might have TB disease.
Examples include coordinating efforts with the state or local
health department, conducting a TB risk assessment of the
setting, developing and instituting a written TB infection-
control plan to ensure prompt detection, airborne infection
isolation, treating persons with suspected or confirmed TB
disease, and screening and evaluating persons who are at risk
for TB disease or who might be exposed to M. tuberculosis.
Air change rate. Ratio of the airflow in volume units per
hour to the volume of the space under consideration in
identical volume units, typically expressed in air changes per
hour (ACH).
Air change rate (equivalent). Ratio of the volumetric air
loss rate associated with an environmental control or
combination of controls (e.g., an air cleaner or ultraviolet
germicidal irradiation [UVGI] system) divided by the volume
of the room in which the control has been applied. The
equivalent air change rate is useful for describing the rate at
which bioaerosols are removed by means other than ventilation.
Air change rate (mechanical). Ratio of the airflow to the
space volume per unit time, typically expressed in ACH.
Air changes per hour (ACH). Air change rate expressed as
the number of air exchange units per hour.
Airborne infection isolation room (AII room). Formerly
called a negative pressure isolation room, an AII room is a
single-occupancy patient-care room used to isolate persons
with suspected or confirmed infectious TB disease.
Environmental factors are controlled in AII rooms to minimize
the transmission of infectious agents that typically are spread
from person to person by droplet nuclei associated with
coughing or aerosolization of contaminated fluids. An AII
room should have these all three of these characteristics: 1)
negative pressure, so air flows under the door gap into the
room; 2) an air flow rate of 6–12 ACH; and 3) direct exhaust
of air from the room to the outside of the building or
recirculation of air through a high efficiency particulate air
(HEPA) filter.
Anergy. Condition in which a person has a diminished
ability to react to antigens because of a medical condition or
situation resulting in immunosuppression. Persons who have
such immunosuppression are considered to be anergic.
Traditionally, anergy is identified through a tuberculin skin
test (TST). Anergy skin testing has poor predictive value and
is not routinely recommended.
Apical. Relating to or located at the tip (an apex).
Asymptomatic. Neither causing nor exhibiting signs or
symptoms of disease.
Bacille Calmette-Guérin (BCG). An attenuated strain of
Mycobacterium bovis that is used in multiple countries
worldwide as a TB vaccine, named after the French scientists
Calmette and Guérin. BCG has limited efficacy in preventing
disease and is rarely used in the United States. The vaccine is
effective in preventing disseminated and meningeal TB disease
in infants and young children and is appropriately used in
multiple countries in which TB disease is endemic.
Boosting. A phenomenon in which some persons who
receive a TST many years after acquiring latent TB infection
(LTBI) have a negative result to an initial TST followed by a
positive result to a subsequent TST. The second (i.e., positive)
result is caused by a boosted immune response of the prior
sensitivity rather than by a new infection. Two-step testing is
used to distinguish new infections from boosted reactions in
TB infection control screening programs that utilize TST for
detecting M. tuberculosis (see Two-step skin testing). Because
QuantiFERON®-TB Gold (QFT-G) test is an in vitro
method, it is not complicated by boosting.
Bronchoscopy. Procedure for examining the respiratory
tract that requires inserting an instrument (bronchoscope),
either flexible or rigid, through the mouth or nose and into
the respiratory tree. Bronchoscopy can be used to obtain
diagnostic specimens and creates a risk for transmission for
exposed health-care professionals when performed on a patient
with pulmonary or laryngeal TB disease.
Glossary
Vol. 55 / RR-9 Recommendations and Reports 49
Cavity. The radiographic appearance of a hole in the lung
parenchyma, typically not involving the pleural space, resulting
from the destruction of pulmonary tissue by an interaction of
M. tuberculosis infection and the host response seen in TB
disease (or other pulmonary infections). TB patients with
cavitary disease indicated by a chest radiograph typically are
more infectious than TB patients without cavitary disease.
Chest x-ray. See Radiography.
Close contact. A person who has shared the same air space
in a household or other enclosed environment for a prolonged
period (i.e., days or weeks, not minutes or hours) with a person
with suspected or confirmed TB disease.
Contact. A person who has shared the same air space with
a person in whom infectious TB disease has been diagnosed.
Although sputum-smear results, the grade of the sputum-smear
result if positive, and sputum culture results all influence the
likelihood of infectiousness, other factors (e.g., exposure time,
environmental conditions, and site of disease) also contribute
to infectiousness.
Contact investigation. The process of finding, notifying,
screening, and treating persons who might have LTBI or TB
disease as a result of recent contact with a person diagnosed
with TB disease. This process is undertaken promptly after a
TB source patient is identified.
Contagious. Refers to a disease that can be transmitted from
one living being to another through direct contact (e.g.,
measles) or indirect contact (e.g., TB or cholera). The agent
responsible for the contagious character of a disease is described
as being infectious; the most common infectious agents are
microorganisms (e.g., M. tuberculosis) or macroorganisms (e.g.,
parasitic worms).
Conversion. See TST conversion.
Conversion rate. The percentage of a population with a
converted test result (TST or QFT-G) for M. tuberculosis
within a specified time. This is calculated by dividing the
number of conversions among eligible persons in the setting
in a specified period (numerator) by the number of persons
who received tests in the setting over the same period
(denominator), multiplied by 100.
Culture. Microorganisms obtained from sputum or samples
of other body fluids that are grown in the laboratory to detect
and identify infection. This test typically takes 2–4 days when
used to detect the majority of bacteria, although cultures for
mycobacteria typically must grow for 2–4 weeks.
Directly observed therapy (DOT). Adherence-enhancing
strategy in which a trained health-care professional or other
specially trained person watches a patient swallow each dose
of medication and records the dates that the medication was
taken. DOT is the standard of care for all patients with TB
disease and should be used for all doses during the course of
treatment for TB disease and for LTBI whenever feasible. All
patients on intermittent (i.e., once- or twice-weekly) treatment
for TB disease or LTBI should receive DOT. Plans for DOT
should be coordinated with the state or local health
department. Rates of relapse and development of drug-
resistance are decreased when DOT is used.
Disposable respirator. A respirator designed to be used and
then discarded; also known as a filtering-facepiece respirator.
Respirators should be discarded after excessive resistance,
physical damage, or hygiene considerations.
Droplet nuclei. Microscopic particles produced when a
person coughs, sneezes, shouts, or sings. These particles can
remain suspended in the air for prolonged periods of time
and can be carried on normal air currents throughout the room
and to adjacent spaces or areas receiving exhaust air.
Drug-susceptibility test. Laboratory test that determines
whether the M. tuberculosis bacteria cultured from a patient’s
isolate are susceptible or resistant to various first-line or second-
line anti-TB drugs.
Enabler. An item or service that helps to remove barriers
for willing (but unable) patients to adhere to anti-TB therapy
(e.g., transportation, bus tokens, stable housing, driver’s license,
and service programs).
Environmental control measures. Physical or mechanical
measures (as opposed to administrative control measures) used
to reduce the risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis. Examples
include ventilation, filtration, ultraviolet lamps, airborne
infection isolation rooms, and local exhaust ventilation devices.
Epidemiologic cluster. A series of cases that can be closely
grouped by time or place.
Erythema. Abnormal redness of the skin. Erythema might
develop around a TST site, but it should not be read as part of
the TST result.
Exposure. The condition of being subjected to something
(e.g., an infectious agent) that could have a harmful effect.
A person exposed to M. tuberculosis does not necessarily
become infected (See Transmission).
Exposure period. The period when the following two events
overlap: 1) the time the contact shares the same air space with
the TB source patient and 2) the infectious period of the source
patient.
Extrapulmonary TB. Disease in any part of the body other
than the lungs (e.g., the kidneys, spine, or lymph nodes.) The
presence of extrapulmonary disease does not exclude
pulmonary TB disease.
False-positive TST or QFT-G result. A TST or QFT-G
result that is interpreted as positive for a particular purpose
(i.e., infection control surveillance or medical and diagnostic
evaluation) in a person who is not actually infected with
M. tuberculosis. For the TST, this is more likely to occur in
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persons who have been vaccinated with BCG or who are
infected with nontuberculous mycobacteria (NTM).
Heating, ventilation, air conditioning (HVAC).
Mechanical systems that provide (either collectively or
individually) heating, ventilating, or air conditioning for
comfort within or associated with a building.
High-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filter. A filter that
is certified to remove >99.97% of particles 0.3 µm in size,
including M. tuberculosis–containing droplet nuclei; the filter
can be either portable or stationary. Use of HEPA filters in
building ventilation systems requires expertise in installation
and maintenance.
Hemoptysis. The expectoration or coughing up of blood
or blood-tinged sputum. Hemoptysis is one of the symptoms
of pulmonary TB disease, and it can also occur in other
pulmonary conditions (e.g., lung cancer).
Immunosuppression and immunocompromising
conditions. A condition in which the immune system is not
functioning normally. The term “immunocompromised” has
come to be defined as the broader term, and the term
“immunosuppression” is now used when referring to states
that were induced by medical treatment or procedures (i.e.,
iatrogenic), including causes that result from therapy for
another condition. Immunocompromised persons are at
increased risk for rapidly progressing to TB disease after
infection with M. tuberculosis. Immunocompromising
conditions also make TB disease more difficult to diagnose,
increasing the likelihood of a false-negative result for a test for
M. tuberculosis (e.g., TST and QFT-G).
Incentive. An item or service that rewards desired behavior
(e.g., adherence to anti-TB therapy). Examples of incentives
include cookies, food, food vouchers, clothing vouchers, and
stickers. Incentives motivate patients to take medication and
keep clinic appointments, and they should be specifically
tailored to each patient.
Induration. Area of firmness produced by an immune cell
infiltration in response to an injected antigen. In tuberculin
skin testing (TST) or anergy testing, the diameter of the
indurated area is measured 48–72 hours after the injection in
a direction perpendicular to the long axis of the forearm and
the result recorded in mm. The induration of the TST result
should be measured, and not erythema (abnormal redness of
the skin).
Infectious. See Contagious.
Infectious droplet nuclei. Droplet nuclei produced by an
infectious TB patient that can carry tubercle bacilli and be
inhaled by others. Although these nuclei typically are produced
from patients with pulmonary TB through coughing, they
can also be generated from aerosolizing procedures (e.g., during
bronchoscopy, autopsy, or wound irrigation) performed at the
site of infectious tissue.
Infectious period. The time during which a person with
TB disease might have transmitted M. tuberculosis organisms
to others. The infectious period typically is defined as 12 weeks
before TB diagnosis or onset of cough (whichever is longer).
If a patient has no TB symptoms, is AFB-smear negative, and
has a non-cavitary chest radiograph, the presumed infectious
period can be reduced to 4 weeks before the date of diagnosis
of suspected TB. If the contact investigation indicates that
TB transmission occurred throughout the identified infectious
period, the time for contact investigation might need to be
expanded beyond the basic 12 weeks.
Isolation. Separation of a person or group of persons from
others to prevent the spread of droplet nuclei. In this report,
the term “airborne infection isolation” is used interchangeably
with “isolation.”
Isoniazid (INH). A drug used to prevent TB disease in
persons who have latent TB infection (LTBI). INH is also
one of the four drugs often used to treat TB disease.
Latent TB infection (LTBI). Infection with M. tuberculosis
in which the bacilli are alive but inactive in the body. Persons
who have LTBI but who do not have TB disease are
asymptomatic, do not feel sick, and cannot spread TB to other
persons. They typically have a positive TST or QFT-G result.
Approximately 5%–10% of infected persons will develop TB
disease at some point in their lives, but the risk is considerably
higher for persons who are immunocompromised, especially
persons infected with HIV. Persons with LTBI can be given
treatment to prevent the infection from progressing to disease.
Mantoux method. The recommended TST method,
performed by injecting 0.1 ml containing 5 tuberculin units
(TU) of purified protein derivative (PPD) intradermally into
the volar or dorsal surface of the forearm. The injection is
made using a 1/4–1/2-inch, 27 gauge needle and a tuberculin
(preferable a safety-type) syringe.
Medical evaluation. An examination conducted for the
purpose of diagnosing TB disease or LTBI, selecting treatment,
and assessing response to therapy. A medical evaluation might
include the following components:
• medical history and TB symptom screening,
• clinical or physical examination,
• screening and diagnostic tests (e.g., TSTs, chest radio-
graphs, bacteriologic examination, and HIV testing),
• counseling, and
• treatment referrals.
Multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR TB). TB disease
caused by M. tuberculosis organisms that are resistant to at
least isoniazid and rifampin.
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Mycobacterium tuberculosis. The bacterium that causes
LTBI and TB disease.
Mycobacterium tuberculosis culture. A laboratory test to
determine the presence of M. tuberculosis. In the absence of
cross-contamination, a positive culture confirms the diagnosis
of TB disease.
N95 disposable respirator. Air-purifying, filtering facepiece
respirators certified by the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health with filters >95% efficient at removing
0.3 micron particles; these respirators are not resistant to oil
(see Respirator).
Negative pressure. The difference in air pressure between
two areas in a health-care setting. A room that is under negative
pressure has a lower pressure than adjacent areas, which keeps
air from flowing out of the room and into adjacent rooms or
areas.
Nontuberculous mycobacteria (NTM). Refers to
mycobacterium species other than those included as part of
M. tuberculosis complex. Although valid from a laboratory
perspective, the term can be misleading because certain types
of NTM cause disease with pathological and clinical
manifestations similar to TB disease. Another term used
interchangeably with NTM is “mycobacteria other than
tuberculosis” (MOTT).
Nucleic acid amplification (NAA) test. Laboratory test
used to target and amplify a single DNA or RNA sequence
for identification. This technique is highly sensitive and specific
for identification of M. tuberculosis, and results from these
tests typically are available within 1–3 days.
Outbreak (TB). The result when transmission of
M. tuberculosis continues to occur (i.e., potentially ongoing or
newly recognized transmission).
Periodic fit testing. Repetition of fit testing performed in
accordance with federal, state, and local regulations. Additional
fit testing should be used when 1) a new model of respirator is
used, 2) a physical characteristic of the user changes, or 3)
when the user or respiratory program administrator is
uncertain that the staff member is obtaining an adequate fit.
Pulmonary TB. TB disease that occurs in the lung
parenchyma. The majority of TB disease is pulmonary.
Purified protein derivative (PPD) tuberculin. A material
used in diagnostic tests for infection with M. tuberculosis. PPD
is a purified tuberculin preparation that was developed in the
1930s and derived from old tuberculin. In the United States,
it is administered as part of a TST that is given as an intradermal
injection of 0.1 ml containing 5 TU (Mantoux method) and
read 48–72 hours later. It also was used in the older version of
QFT-G (see Tuberculin skin test).
QuantiFERON®-TB Gold test (QFT-G). An in vitro
cytokine assay that assesses the cell-mediated immune response
to specific antigens of M. tuberculosis (ESAT6 and CFP-10)
in whole blood used to determine M. tuberculosis infection.
Unlike the TST, the QFT-G requires only a single visit. The
QFT-G is more specific than the TST and is less affected by
previous BCG vaccination and infection with nontuberculous
mycobacteria (NTM).
QFT-G converter. A change from a negative to a positive
QFT-G result.
Radiography. Method of viewing internal body structures
by using radiation to project an image onto a film, computer
screen, or paper. A chest radiograph is taken to view the
respiratory system of a person who is being evaluated for
pulmonary TB disease. Abnormalities (e.g., infiltrates or
cavities in the lungs and enlarged lymph nodes) described on
a chest radiography can indicate the presence of TB disease.
Recirculation. Ventilation in which all or most of the air
exhausted from an area is returned to the same area or other
areas of the setting.
Reinfection. A second infection that follows recovery from
a previous infection by the same causative agent. Often used
when referring to an episode of TB disease resulting from a
subsequent infection with M. tuberculosis.
Resistance. Ability of certain strains of mycobacteria,
including M. tuberculosis, to grow and multiply in the presence
of certain drugs that ordinarily kill them. Such strains are
referred to as drug-resistant strains and contribute to drug-
resistant TB disease (see Multidrug-resistant TB.)
Respirator. A device worn to prevent the wearer from
inhaling airborne contaminants.
Respiratory protection. The third level in the hierarchy of
TB infection-control measures (after administrative and
environmental controls).
Risk factor. Any condition or circumstance (i.e., causal
agents) that is associated (without confounding or bias) with
an increase in the frequency of disease.
Screening. Measures used to identify persons who have TB
disease or LTBI (see Symptom screen).
Secondary cases. Cases of TB disease caused by transmission
from the source patient.
Smear (AFB smear). Laboratory technique for visualizing
mycobacteria. The specimen (direct or concentrated) is spread
onto a laboratory slide, stained, and examined using a
microscope. Smear results typically are available within
24 hours of specimen collection. The concentration of
organisms per unit area of slide (the smear grade) correlates
with the degree of infectiousness. However, a positive AFB
smear result is not diagnostic of TB disease because organisms
other than M. tuberculosis (e.g., nontuberculous mycobacteria
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[NTM]) might be seen on an AFB smear result (see
Nontuberculous mycobacteria and Acid-fast bacilli).
Source control. Manipulation of a process preventing an
emission (e.g., aerosolized M. tuberculosis) at the place of origin.
Examples of source control methods include booths in which
a patient coughs and produces sputum, biological safety
cabinets in laboratories, and local exhaust ventilation.
Source patient (TB). The patient who was the original
source of infection for secondary cases or contacts.
Specimen. Any body fluid, secretion, or tissue sent to a
laboratory in which diagnostic tests, smears, and cultures for
M. tuberculosis are performed.
Sputum. Mucus secretions coughed up from deep within
the lungs (to be distinguished from saliva and nasal secretions).
If a patient has pulmonary disease, an examination of the
sputum by smear and culture can be helpful in evaluating the
organism responsible for certain infectious diseases (e.g., TB).
Sputum is different than and should not be confused with
saliva or nasal secretions.
Sputum induction. Method used to obtain sputum from a
patient who is unable to cough up a specimen spontaneously.
The patient inhales a saline mist, which stimulates coughing
from deep within the lungs.
Susceptibility. See Drug-susceptibility test.
Suspect TB patient. A person in whom a diagnosis of TB
disease is being considered, regardless of whether anti-TB
therapy has been started. Persons should not remain in this
category for >3 months. A patient might be determined as
suspect if one or more of the following criteria are satisfied:
• coughing for >3 weeks and one or more additional signs
or symptoms of TB disease (e.g., loss of appetite, unex-
plained weight loss, night sweats, bloody sputum or
hemoptysis, hoarseness, fever, fatigue, and chest pain),
• a positive TST result and signs or symptoms of infection
in the lung, pleura, or airways,
• positive AFB sputum smear result, or
• Pending results from sputum culture or NAA test for
M. tuberculosis.
Symptomatic. Exhibiting signs or symptoms of a particular
disease or disorder. Symptoms of pulmonary TB disease (or
infection in the lung, pleura, or airways [including the larynx])
include coughing for >3 weeks, loss of appetite, unexplained
weight loss, night sweats, bloody sputum or hemoptysis,
hoarseness, fever, fatigue, or chest pain.
Symptom screen. A procedure used during a clinical
evaluation in which the patient is asked if they have experienced
any signs or symptoms of TB disease.
TB case. A particular episode of clinical TB disease. This
term refers only to the disease, not to the person with the
disease. By law, TB cases and suspect TB cases must be reported
to the state or local health department.
TB contact. A person who has shared the same air space
with a person who has TB disease for a sufficient amount of
time to allow possible transmission of M. tuberculosis.
TB disease. TB disease is caused by Mycobacterium
tuberculosis. The bacteria can attack any part of the body, but
they typically attack the lungs. TB disease is diagnosed by
isolation of M. tuberculosis in a culture. TB disease of the lungs
or larynx can be transmitted when a person with the disease
coughs, sings, laughs, speaks, or breathes. TB disease might
be infectious.
TB infection. TB infection is the term used for persons
with positive TST or QFT-G results, negative bacteriologic
studies (if conducted), and no clinical, bacteriologic, or
radiographic evidence of TB disease. A better term is infection
with M. tuberculosis. In the majority of persons who inhale
TB bacteria and become infected, the body is able to fight the
bacteria to stop them from growing. The bacteria become
inactive, but they remain alive in the body and can become
active later. TB infection is not contagious; patients with TB
infection can not spread TB to other persons.
TB infection control program. Early detection, isolation,
and treatment of persons with infectious TB through a
hierarchy of control measures, including 1) administrative
controls to reduce the risk for exposure to persons with
infectious TB disease; 2) environmental controls to prevent
the spread and reduce the concentration of infectious droplet
nuclei in the air; and 3) respiratory protection in areas where
the risk for exposure to M. tuberculosis is high (e.g., in airborne
infection isolation rooms). A TB infection-control plan should
include surveillance of inmates and correctional staff.
TB screening. Screening conducted for administrative
infection control purposes. Initial TB screening can be
conducted through use of TSTs, QFT-Gs, and symptom
screening, and follow up tests can be conducted using various
other testing methods (e.g., chest radiograph or sputum
examination for AFB and culture) (see Symptom screen).
TB risk assessment. An initial and ongoing evaluation of
the risk for transmission of M. tuberculosis in a particular
correctional facility. A risk assessment considers certain factors,
including the number of inmates with TB housed during the
preceding year and the number of inmates housed who come
from groups that are at risk for TB (e.g., HIV-infected persons
and recent immigrants from high-incidence countries). The
TB risk assessment determines the types of screening and
infection-control measures indicated for the correctional
facility.
TB skin test. See Tuberculin skin test.
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Transmission. Spread of an infectious agent from one person
to another. The likelihood of transmission of M. tuberculosis
is directly related to the duration and intensity of exposure
(see Exposure).
Treatment for LTBI. Treatment for persons with LTBI that
prevents development of TB disease.
TST. See Tuberculin skin test.
TST conversion. In programs using the TST method of
screening, a change from a negative test result to a positive
test result. The size of the change in mm induration needed to
be considered a conversion varies based on the baseline testing
results and whether the inmate or employee has a known
exposure to a TB patient. In programs using QFT-G, a change
from negative to positive result is considered a QFT-G
conversion. A conversion (TST or QFT-G) typically is
interpreted as presumptive evidence of new M. tuberculosis
infection and poses an increased risk for progression to TB
disease.
TST conversion rate. The percentage of a population in
which TST results converted within a specified time. This rate
is calculated by dividing the number of TST conversions
among persons in the setting in a specified period (numerator)
by the number of persons who received TSTs in the setting
over the same period (denominator), multiplied by 100.
Tuberculin. A sterile liquid containing proteins extracted
from cultures of tubercle bacilli and used in tests for
tuberculosis.
Tuberculin skin test (TST). Method used to assess the
likelihood that a person is infected with M. tuberculosis.
A small dose of PPD-tuberculin is injected just beneath the
surface of the skin by the Mantoux method, and the area is
examined 48–72 hours after the injection. The indurated
margins should be read transverse (i.e., perpendicular) to the
long axis of the forearm.
Tuberculosis (TB). Clinically active disease caused by an
organism in the M. tuberculosis complex (typically
M. tuberculosis, but also including M. bovis, M. africanum,
and others).
Two-step skin testing. Procedure used for the baseline skin
testing of persons who will routinely receive TSTs to reduce
the likelihood of mistaking a boosted reaction for a new
infection. If an initial TST result is classified as negative, the
second step of a two-step TST should be administered 1–3
weeks after the first TST was administered. If the second TST
result is positive, it likely represents a boosted reaction,
indicating that infection most likely occurred in the past. If
the second TST result is also negative, the person is classified
as not infected.
Ultraviolet germicidal irradiation (UVGI). Use of
ultraviolet radiation to kill or inactivate microorganisms.
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By Internet
1. Read this MMWR (Vol. 55, RR-9), which contains the correct answers to
the questions beginning on the next page.
2. Go to the MMWR Continuing Education Internet site at http://www.cdc.
gov/mmwr/cme/conted.html.
3. Select which exam you want to take and select whether you want to register
for CME, CEU, CNE, or CHES credit.
4. Fill out and submit the registration form.
5. Select exam questions. To receive continuing education credit, you must
answer all of the questions. Questions with more than one correct answer
will instruct you to “Indicate all that apply.”
6. Submit your answers no later than July 7, 2009.
7. Immediately print your Certificate of Completion for your records.
By Mail or Fax
1. Read this MMWR (Vol. 55, RR-9), which contains the correct answers to
the questions beginning on the next page.
2. Complete all registration information on the response form, including your
name, mailing address, phone number, and e-mail address, if available.
3. Indicate whether you are registering for CME, CEU, CNE, or CHES  credit.
4. Select your answers to the questions, and mark the corresponding letters on
the response form. To receive continuing education credit, you must
answer all of the questions. Questions with more than one correct answer
will instruct you to “Indicate all that apply.”
5. Sign and date the response form or a photocopy of the form and send no
later than July 7, 2009, to
Fax: 404-498-2388
Mail: MMWR CE Credit
Coordinating Center for Health Information and Service, MS E-90
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
1600 Clifton Rd, N.E.
Atlanta, GA 30333
6. Your Certificate of Completion will be mailed to you within 30 days.
INSTRUCTIONS
You must complete and return the response form electronically or by mail by
July 7, 2009, to receive continuing education credit. If you answer all of the
questions, you will receive an award letter for 2.1 hours Continuing Medical
Education (CME) credit; 0.2 Continuing Education Units (CEUs); 2.5
contact hours Continuing Nursing Education (CNE) credit; or 2.1 contact
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hours Certified Health Education Specialist (CHES) credit. If you return the
form electronically, you will receive educational credit immediately. If you mail
the form, you will receive educational credit in approximately 30 days. No fees
are charged for participating in this continuing education activity.
ACCREDITATION
Continuing Medical Education (CME). CDC is accredited by the Accreditation Council for Continuing Medical Education to provide continuing medical education
for physicians. CDC designates this educational activity for a maximum of 2.1 hours in category 1 credit toward the AMA Physician’s Recognition Award. Each physician should
claim only those hours of credit that he/she actually spent in the educational activity.
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Goal and Objectives
This report provides information regarding measures recommended to prevent and control tuberculosis (TB) in correctional and detention settings. The goal of this
report is to assist public health departments, correctional medical directors and administrators, private correctional health vendors, federal and state agencies,
professional organizations, health care professionals, and policymakers in reaching informed decisions regarding the prevention and control of TB in correctional and
detention facilities. Upon completion of this educational activity, the reader should be able to 1) describe recommended TB screening policies for correctional and
detention facilities on the basis of risk assessment; 2) describe the controls used to prevent transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis in correctional and detention
facilities; 3) list the components of comprehensive discharge planning for inmates and detainees who have TB disease or latent tuberculosis infection (LTBI) and are
released into the community; 4) describe the principles of diagnosing illness and treating patients with TB disease and LTBI infection in correctional and detention
facilities; and 5) describe the steps involved in conducting a contact investigation in a correctional or detention facility for a patient with infectious TB.
To receive continuing education credit, please answer all of the following questions.
1. The risk for a correctional facility in which patients with infectious TB
disease were housed during the previous year would be considered…
A. minimal.
B. nonminimal.
C. excessive.
D. average.
E. other.
2. Inmates or detainees with symptoms suggestive of TB disease or with
a history of inadequate treatment for TB disease…
A. may be housed in cells with other inmates and detainees with TB
disease while awaiting evaluation.
B. should be transferred to the nearest hospital for urgent bronchoscopy.
C. should be placed in an airborne infection isolation room until they
have undergone a thorough medical evaluation.
D. should have a tuberculin skin test (TST) and QuantiFERON®-TB
Gold assay test performed.
3. For correctional facilities, a CDC/NIOSH-approved N95 air-purifying
respirator…
A. should never be used.
B. should be used only when patients with TB are outdoors.
C. has been demonstrated to be 100% effective in preventing TB
transmission even during high-risk procedures (e.g., bronchoscopy).
D. will provide adequate respiratory protection in the majority of
situations that require the use of respirators.
4. A tuberculosis skin test (TST)…
A. is considered positive only if the result is >10 mm induration.
B. should never be administered to pregnant women.
C. might be negative in patients with TB disease.
D. may be read by the patient in the majority of circumstances.
5. Treatment of TB disease…
A. for the majority of patients initially consists of isoniazid, rifampin,
ethambutol, and pyrazinamide while awaiting drug-susceptibility test
results.
B. for the majority of patients consists of isoniazid, rifampin, ethambutol,
and pyrazinamide for the entire course of therapy.
C. may be given only twice a week for all patients, including those infected
with human immunodeficiency virus (regardless of CD4
T-lymphocyte count), after 2 weeks of daily treatment have been
completed.
D. should never be extended beyond 6 months if the patient’s
M. tuberculosis isolate is susceptible to all first-line medications.
6. For correctional and detention facilities, comprehensive discharge
planning should include…
A. collaborating with public health systems and other community health-
care professionals.
B. ensuring continuity of case-management.
C. evaluating discharge-planning procedures and modifying procedures
as needed to improve outcomes.
D. all of the above.
7. In correctional and detention facilities, contact investigations should
be conducted for…
A. patients with TB meningitis.
B. patients with suspected or confirmed pulmonary, laryngeal, or pleural
TB with cavitary disease on chest radiograph or positive sputum acid-
fast bacilli smears.
C. patients with tuberculin skin test results >5 mm induration.
D. all employees with a cough.
8. In correctional and detention facilities, persons who are close contacts
of patients with infectious TB and who have a negative initial TST
should have a second TST administered…
A. 1–3 weeks after exposure has ended.
B. 4–6 weeks after exposure has ended.
C. 8–10 weeks after exposure has ended.
D. 12–16 weeks after exposure has ended.
9. Which of the following should be incorporated into TB education for
inmates?
A. Contact investigation guidelines.
B. The meaning of a positive TST or QuantiFERON®-TB Gold test
result and treatment options for LTBI.
C. Discussion of the use of administrative and engineering controls and
personal protective equipment.
D. Differences between and among jails, prisons, and other forms of
detention facilities.
10. Successful monitoring and evaluation of a tuberculosis prevention
and control program includes all of the following except…
A. providing press releases on TB control activities.
B. identifying collaborators.
C. focusing the evaluation to assess TB risk and performance.
D. collecting and organizing data.
E. using the information to improve the TB program.
11. Which best describes your professional activities?
A. Physician.
B. Nurse.
C. Health educator.
D. Office staff.
E. Other.
12. I plan to use these recommendations as the basis for …(Indicate all
that apply.)
A. health education materials.
B. insurance reimbursement policies.
C. local practice guidelines.
D. public policy.
E. other.
13. Overall, the length of the journal report was…
A. much too long.
B. a little too long.
C. just right.
D. a little too short.
E. much too short.
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14. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe recommended
TB screening policies for correctional and detention facilities on the
basis of risk assessment.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
15. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe the controls
used to prevent transmission of M. tuberculosis in correctional and
detention facilities.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
16. After reading this report, I am confident I can list the components of
comprehensive discharge planning for inmates and detainees who have
TB disease or LTBI and are released into the community.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
17. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe the principles
of diagnosing TB illness and treating patients with TB disease and
LTBI infection in correctional and detention facilities.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
18. After reading this report, I am confident I can describe the steps
involved in conducting a contact investigation in a correctional or
detention facility for a patient with infectious TB.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
19. The learning outcomes (objectives) were relevant to the goals of this report.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
20. The instructional strategies used in this report (text, tables, and
appendicies) helped me learn the material.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
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21. The content was appropriate given the stated objectives of the report.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
22. The content expert(s) demonstrated expertise in the subject matter.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
23. Overall, the quality of the journal report was excellent.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
24. These recommendations will improve the quality of my practice.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
25. The availability of continuing education credit influenced my
decision to read this report.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
26. The MMWR format was conducive to learning this content.
A. Strongly agree.
B. Agree.
C. Undecided.
D. Disagree.
E. Strongly disagree.
27. Do you feel this course was commercially biased? (Indicate yes or no;
if yes, please explain in the space provided.)
A. Yes.
B. No.
28. How did you learn about the continuing education activity?
A. Internet.
B. Advertisement (e.g., fact sheet, MMWR cover, newsletter, or journal).
C. Coworker/supervisor.
D. Conference presentation.
E. MMWR subscription.
F. Other.
Correct answers for questions 1–10.
1. B; 2. C; 3. D; 4. C; 5. A; 6. D; 7. B; 8. C; 9. B; 10. A.
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